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CHALLENGING THE RANDOMNESS OF PANEL
ASSIGNMENT IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS
Adam S. Chilton† & Marin K. Levy‡
A fundamental academic assumption about the federal
courts of appeals is that the three-judge panels that hear
cases have been randomly configured.  Scores of scholarly
articles have noted this “fact,” and it has been relied on heav-
ily by empirical researchers.  Even though there are practical
reasons to doubt that judges would always be randomly as-
signed to panels—such as courts might well want to take into
account the scheduling needs of their judges—this assump-
tion has never been tested.  This Article is the first to do so,
and it calls the assumption into question.
To determine whether the circuit courts utilize random as-
signment, we have created what we believe to be the largest
dataset of panel assignments of those courts constructed to
date.  Using this dataset, we tested whether panel assign-
ments are, in fact, random by comparing the actual assign-
ments to truly random panels generated by code that we have
created to simulate the panel generation process.  Our results
provide evidence of nonrandomness in the federal courts of
appeals.
To be sure, the analysis here is descriptive, not explana-
tory or normative.  We do not ourselves mean to suggest that
strict randomness is a desirable goal and indeed note that
there are many good reasons for departing from it.  Our aim is
to test an existing scholarly assumption, and we believe our
findings will have implications for the courts, court scholars,
and empirical researchers.
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INTRODUCTION
A fundamental academic assumption about the federal
courts of appeals is that the three-judge panels that decide
cases have been randomly configured.  Scores of scholarly arti-
cles note this “fact,”1 with some scholars even going so far as to
call the random creation of panels a “hallmark” of the American
appellate system.2  Indeed, an entire quantitative literature on
the courts—arguing that the composition of panels has sub-
stantive effects on case outcomes—has justified its research
1 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 953, 1009 (2005) (“In the Courts of Appeals, panels are the product of
random draws of three among a larger set of members of the court.”); Lee Epstein,
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 110 (2011) (“We
assume that members of a panel are chosen randomly from the judges of the
court, which is the practice in all circuits.” (citation omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein &
Thomas J. Miles, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 2193, 2197
(2009) (noting that within the federal courts of appeals, “judges are randomly
assigned to three-judge panels”).
2 Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving
American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 216 & n.4 (1999) (“[T]he random assign-
ment of federal appellate judges to panels has become a ‘hallmark’ of the
system.”).
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design and identification strategy for making causal inferences
on this basic premise.3
And yet, what if the panels in many of the circuit courts
were not strictly random?  This seems quite possible if not even
likely given that courts might want to take into account, among
other things, the scheduling needs of the judges and want to
space out sittings to keep workloads manageable.  And what if
taking into account these factors ultimately had an effect on
the distribution of a judicial characteristic, such as ideology?
While a handful of scholars have considered the possibility of
nonrandomness generally,4 there has been no systematic test-
ing of whether the panels of the twelve circuit courts are in fact
nonrandom.  This Article is a first step in filling this void, and it
calls the academic assumption into question.
To test this randomness assumption, we have built what
we believe to be the most comprehensive dataset of federal
appellate court panel assignments constructed to date.  Our
dataset brings together the calendar information for all twelve
regional circuits during a five-year period between September
2008 and August 2013.5  This dataset contains information on
3 See infra Subpart I.C.
4 See, e.g., Burton M. Atkins & William Zavoina, Judicial Leadership on the
Court of Appeals: A Probability Analysis of Panel Assignment in Race Relations
Cases on the Fifth Circuit, 18 AM. J. POL. SCI. 701, 704 (1974); J. Robert Brown, Jr.
& Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78
TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1041–43 (2000); Tom S. Clark, A Principal-Agent Theory of En
Banc Review, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 57 n.3 (2009).
Note that whether appellate panels are randomly configured is a different
question than whether cases are assigned randomly to judges once those panels
are in place.  On that score, scholars have probed more deeply. See, e.g., Matthew
Hall, Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial Assignment in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 574 (2010) (assessing CASS R.
SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICI-
ARY (2006) in light of assumed random judicial assignment of cases in the federal
courts of appeals).
5 See infra Subpart II.C.
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over 7756 judges who have comprised over 10,000 panels
during this time.7
Using this dataset, we are able to test whether the panels of
judges that actually were formed are consistent with random
assignment.  To do so, we have written code that takes the
number of panels that were formed each term in every circuit
and the judges who sat in the circuit at that time, and then
simulates the random creation of panels a large number of
times—in our case, we use simulation to generate over a billion
panels.8  We can then compare the distribution of some observ-
able characteristic in the panels as they were actually formed
with the panels that resulted from random assignment, and
evaluate the likelihood that panel assignments in a given cir-
cuit were random.9
To test random assignment in this way, one could select
just about any observable characteristic of the judges to evalu-
ate (such as whether or not the distribution of judges who wear
eyeglasses is random).  We wanted to select a characteristic
that was easily observable, objective, had variance, and (unlike
whether a judge wears eyeglasses) was relevant to the aca-
demic literature.  Accordingly, we decided to select whether or
6 A follower of the federal courts might be surprised to see such a high figure
here, as the number of active appellate judgeships in the country is 179 (and this
figure includes the Federal Circuit, which we do not). See U.S. Courts of Appeals
Additional Authorized Judgeships, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. COURTS,  http://
www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships [http://perma.cc/
AGN8-FCUY] (follow the “Additional Authorized Judgeships—Since 1960” hyper-
link under the “Courts of Appeals” heading) (listing federal court of appeals judge-
ships by circuit).  However, the 179 figure only includes active appellate
judgeships, not senior judgeships, and in some circuits the number of senior
judges is close to the number of active judges.  Moreover, it should be remembered
that many district judges sit by designation at least occasionally on the circuit
courts, and those judges are included in our dataset.  There are currently 667
active district court judgeships (a figure that also does not include senior judge-
ships). U.S. District Courts Additional Authorized Judgeships, ADMIN. OFF. U.S.
COURTS,  http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships
[http://perma.cc/AGN8-FCUY] (follow the “Additional Authorized Judgeships—
Since 1960” hyperlink under the “District Courts” heading).  Finally, it should be
remembered that other Article III judges, such as judges from the United States
Court of International Trade, occasionally sit by designation, which raises the
total number of judges during this time frame as well.
7 See infra Subpart II.C.  “Judicial Term” here is somewhat artificial.  Al-
though some circuits, such as the D.C. Circuit, have formal terms, others do not.
We use this phrase to mean the year of sittings between September 1 and August
31 of the following calendar year.
8 For an explanation of why we used simulation to generate one billion
possible panel assignments, see infra Subpart II.D.
9 For a discussion of the assumptions that were made while generating these
predictions, see infra Subpart II.C & Subpart II.D.  For a discussion of the limita-
tions of our method, see infra Subpart III.C.
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not a judge was appointed by a Republican president.  This
characteristic plainly satisfies the first three criteria.  On the
fourth, the party of the appointing president is a widely used
proxy for the ideology of judges,10 and  a great deal of scholar-
ship has focused on testing the influence of ideology on judicial
behavior.11  Since this characteristic of judges (that is, whether
they were appointed by a Republican president) is easily ob-
servable, objective, has a great deal of variance, and is theoreti-
cally important, we believe it is the ideal characteristic to
evaluate the distribution of when testing whether panel assign-
ments are random.12
Ultimately, our results provide evidence of nonrandomness
along this dimension in the federal courts of appeals.  Specifi-
cally, our primary results suggest that several of the circuit
courts have panels that are nonrandom in ways that impact
the ideological balance of panels.
There are several key points that should be clearly under-
stood concerning our data and methodology at the outset.
First, we have examined deviations from strict randomness in
panel composition to report a statistical phenomenon, not to
suggest any improper motive by the chief judges, circuit execu-
tives, or clerks of court who perform the immensely challenging
task of creating a court calendar for sometimes as many as
dozens of judges, often six months or a year in advance.  As one
coauthor has learned from conducting a multiyear qualitative
study of nearly half of the courts of appeals,13 many entirely
legitimate factors will inevitably cause deviations from strict
randomness.  Such factors include spacing judicial assign-
ments (so that no judge has several week-long sittings in a
row), accommodating vacation schedules, honoring the sched-
uling preferences of senior judges (whose additional days of
service provide much-needed support to the court as a whole),
and honoring recusals for disqualification, health, or other
10 See, e.g., Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 109; Hall, supra note R
4, at 581–85; Sunstein & Miles, supra note 1, at 2200–01.  We of course note, as R
others have done, that this proxy is not a perfect measure of one’s ideology. See,
e.g., Hall, supra note 4, at 585–86 (suggesting that scholars “be cautious” when
“assum[ing] that party identification is simply a proxy for ideology”).
11 See infra Subpart II.B.
12 See infra Subpart II.B.
13 See Marin K. Levy, Beyond Strict Randomness: Understanding and Evalu-
ating Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals (2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (describing, based on qualitative research of five
circuit courts, the different factors courts of appeals take into account when
creating calendars).
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valid reasons.  We have no reason to believe that anything be-
yond a combination of such factors has led to our results.
Second, as the foregoing discussion makes plain, strict
randomness will often not be desirable or even feasible in many
circuit courts.  As one example, in circuits that do not have
designated court weeks but instead hear cases on a rolling
basis, strict randomness could lead to one judge being as-
signed to panels two or even three weeks in a row whereas
others could have a gap of several months between assign-
ments.  Such a schedule would clearly prove unworkable over
time, rendering strict randomness inconsistent with sound
court administration.
Third, as the preceding paragraphs make plain, we do not
purport to—nor could we—replicate the exact processes used
by the circuit courts to create panels.  For example,  a circuit
court could have an unstated rule that no more than one senior
judge will sit on a panel so that the majority of each panel is
comprised of active members of court.  This rule, in turn, could
have an impact on the ideological balance of panels if, say, the
cohort of senior judges had more conservative judges or more
liberal judges when compared to the court as a whole—a limi-
tation that we do not use.  Again, our position is that rules like
this are departures from randomness (and generally are not
publicly available).  As such, we test whether the panels that
were actually formed are what would be expected if the judges
were randomly assigned to panels, based on the number of
panels that the judges actually sat on in a given term.
Finally, like much empirical scholarship, our results are
communicated in terms of statistical significance—that is,
what we can ultimately say is whether the chances of a given
circuit’s panels being randomly configured are quite low or not.
It thus may be the case that in any given circuit, the chief
judge, circuit executive, or clerk of court utilized a random
process and simply produced results that were highly unlikely
to occur.  Or alternatively, it may be the case that a given
circuit used a nonrandom process but produced results that
appeared random.  That said, although we cannot definitively
determine whether a process is nonrandom, we can say that it
is unlikely that chance alone can explain the evidence of non-
randomness that we detected overall.  Indeed, we can say with
roughly 97% confidence that the evidence of nonrandomness
that we detected for the ideological balance of panels cannot be
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explained by chance alone.14  Accordingly, our results suggest
that the assumption that panels are randomly configured in all
of the federal courts of appeals is false.
Although our data and method are not without limitations,
we believe our results have several implications: (A) the pub-
licly available information about how federal appellate panels
are formed appears to be incomplete; (B) the judicial literature
going forward should not assume that panels are in fact ran-
dom; and (C) the quantitative literature specifically should re-
think relying on the randomness assumption when conducting
empirical research and the results of some existing studies
may need to be reconsidered.
The Article proceeds as follows.  In Part I we provide an
overview of the long-standing assumption of random panels.
Specifically, this Part explains generally how oral argument
panels are formed and shows how much of the publicly availa-
ble information about the process describes it as a random one
or at least consistent with a random one.  It then considers how
broadly the randomness assumption has been held, and its
relevance, in the general courts and quantitative literatures.  In
Part II we detail the methodology of the project, including the
construction of a dataset on oral argument panels, the hypoth-
esis we set out to test, and how that hypothesis was ultimately
tested.  Then, in Part III, we present the findings, which provide
evidence of nonrandomness in panel formation.  Finally, in Part
IV, we briefly consider the implications of these findings for
courts, the judicial and quantitative literatures, and our under-
standing of the federal appellate system more broadly.
I
THE LONG-STANDING ASSUMPTION OF RANDOM PANELS
It has been the practice of the federal courts of appeals for
well over a century to hear cases in panels of three judges.15
Though the creation of panels is technically governed by stat-
14 This estimate is based on a number of assumptions.  For an explanation of
how we calculated these probabilities, see infra Subpart III.B.
15 The general form of the current courts of appeals originates with the Act of
March 3, 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.  Of course, not all cases receive
oral argument; indeed, the majority of cases today that are decided on the merits
are decided solely on the briefs. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 2013, tbl.B-1 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/
Viewer.aspx?doc-/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2013/
tables/B01Mar13.pdf [http://perma.cc/2CEQ-RL6K] (follow the “Download Data
Table” hyperlink) (stating that of the 38,245 cases terminated on the merits in the
twelve-month period ending March 31, 2013, 28,593 were submitted on the
briefs, meaning decided without oral argument).
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ute, the relevant code states only that the panels must consist
of three judges and that those panels shall sit at the times and
places “as the court directs.”16  Accordingly, it falls upon the
circuits not just to create their own panels, but also to deter-
mine how to create their own panels.  The circuits have re-
sponded in different ways with some courts relying upon the
chief judge17 to construct the panels and others relying on the
clerk of court18 or the circuit executive.19  One commonality is
that quite a few circuits state that the process by which they
create their panels is a random one or at least would produce
results consistent with a random one.20
The notion that panels are formed randomly has moved
into the various academic literatures.  There is a robust general
courts literature that has consistently held this assumption.
Furthermore, there is a broad, quantitative literature on judi-
cial decision making that has relied on this assumption to
reach its results.
In this Part we review the long-standing assumption of
panel randomness.  First, we consider the publicly available
information about panel formation, including a recent mono-
graph by the Federal Judicial Center and the local rules and
internal operating procedures of the circuits, in which the for-
mation process is often described as random or consistent with
a random process.  Second, we discuss the general courts and
quantitative literatures respectively, showing how the assump-
tion of randomness has been widely held for decades and has
been important to numerous articles along the way.
16 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2012).  Specifically, subsection (b) reads in full:
In each circuit the court may authorize the hearing and determina-
tion of cases and controversies by separate panels, each consisting
of three judges, at least a majority of whom shall be judges of that
court, unless such judges cannot sit because recused or disquali-
fied, or unless the chief judge of that court certifies that there is an
emergency including, but not limited to, the unavailability of a judge
of the court because of illness.  Such panels shall sit at the times
and places and hear the cases and controversies assigned as the
court directs.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit shall determine by rule a procedure for the rotation of judges
from panel to panel to ensure that all of the judges sit on a represen-
tative cross section of the cases heard and, notwithstanding the first
sentence of this subsection, may determine by rule the number of
judges, not less than three, who constitute a panel.
Id.
17 E.g., LAURAL HOOPER, DEAN MILETICH & ANGELIA LEVY, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 79 (2d ed. 2011)
(Second Circuit).
18 E.g., id. at 54 (D.C. Circuit).
19 E.g., id. at 67 (First Circuit).
20 See infra notes 24–33. R
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A. Publicly Available Information on Panel Formation
The most recent Annual Report of the Ninth Circuit has a
short section on an interesting occurrence: for the first time in
Ninth Circuit history, the court had one oral argument panel
comprised of all judges from Alaska.21  The Report then notes
that “[a]ppellate panels are randomly assigned” and that there-
fore this particular panel “resulted from the luck of the draw.”22
Like the Ninth Circuit, several of the federal appellate
courts have stated in various reports that they form their oral
argument panels randomly.23  For example, the most recent
monograph on case management from the Federal Judicial
Center notes that in the Fourth Circuit, “active judges are ran-
domly assigned to argument panels by a computer program.”24
And the Federal Judicial Center reports that in the Eleventh
Circuit, “[t]o ensure complete objectivity in assigning cases, the
names of the active judges for the sessions of the court are
drawn by lot for the entire court year.”25
Another set of circuits state that they create their oral ar-
gument panels with the goal of approximately equalizing the
number of times each judge sits with every other judge.  Al-
though the process of panel configuration is therefore not tech-
nically a random one, the results should still be consistent with
random panel assignment.26  The Federal Judicial Center
states that in the Fifth Circuit, “[a] computer program is used
to achieve random assignment of judges to panels,” though it
includes the caveat that the program also tries to avoid judges
sitting together too often in any given court term.27  The Sixth
Circuit states in its Internal Operating Procedures that “[t]he
court sits over two-week periods” and “[a]t least six active
judges are assigned to one of the two sitting weeks at random”
21 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT, UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (2014).
22 Id.
23 At least one scholar concluded in 1990 that all of the circuit courts claimed
to create their oral argument panels randomly. See Donald R. Songer, Criteria for
Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal Rules Versus Empiri-
cal Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 310 (1990) (“According to circuit rules in each
circuit, judges are assigned to panels on a purely random basis.”).  As this sub-
part details, we found that the majority of the circuits today state that they utilize
either a random process or a process that would produce results consistent with a
random process.
24 HOOPER, MILETICH & LEVY, supra note 17, at 99. R
25 Id. at 208.
26 One can think of a series of coin tosses by analogy.  Here, it is as if the coin
is intentionally being turned to heads 50% of the time and tails 50% of the time as
opposed to leaving the matter strictly to chance.
27 HOOPER, MILETICH & LEVY, supra note 17, at 115. R
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with “the balance of the court’s active judges . . . assigned to
the other sitting week” though goes on to note that “[j]udges are
later assigned to panels during the sitting weeks using an auto-
mated routine which searches the court’s database to deter-
mine which active judges have the longest intervals between
sitting pairing.”28  Likewise, in the Seventh Circuit, the
“[a]ssignment of judges to panels is random except that the
circuit executive uses a computer-generated table to ensure
that over a two-year period a judge sits approximately the same
number of times with every other judge of the court.”29  Differ-
ing slightly from the recent Ninth Circuit Annual Report,30 the
Federal Judicial Center states that in the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he
random assignment of judges by computer to particular days
or weeks on the calendar is intended to equalize the workload
among the judges . . . [and] to enable each active judge to sit
with every other active and senior judge approximately the
same number of times over a two-year period.”31  The Report
also notes that a final goal in panel creation is to “assign active
judges an equal number of times to each of the locations at
which the court holds hearings.”32  And in a similar vein, the
Tenth Circuit assignment of judges to argument panels is done
“randomly using a software program developed by the court”
whereby “[t]he program the court uses to assign judges to
panels equalizes the number of times judges sit with one an-
other over a period of one year.”33
To be sure, not every circuit claims to form its panels ran-
domly or with equalization in mind.  For example, some state
28 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT, SIXTH CIRCUIT INTERNAL OPERAT-
ING PROCEDURES, Internal Operating Procedure 34(a)(1) (2014).
29 HOOPER, MILETICH & LEVY, supra note 17, at 140.  See also the Seventh R
Circuit Practitioner’s Handbook, stating:
Each judge is assigned to sit approximately the same number of
times per term with each of his or her colleagues.  The calendar of
cases to be orally argued in a given week is prepared and circulated
to the judges, and the judges advise the chief judge of any disqualifi-
cations.  The disclosure statements filed pursuant to Circuit Rule
26.1 and Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 are intended to make this process
more accurate and, therefore, more helpful.  The judges are then
randomly assigned by computer to sit in various panels.  This sepa-
ration of the processes of randomly assigning panels and scheduling
cases avoids even the remote possibility of the deliberate assign-
ment of an appeal to a particular panel.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK FOR
APPEALS 10 (2014).
30 See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. R
31 HOOPER, MILETICH & LEVY, supra note 17, at 174. R
32 Id.
33 Id. at 194.
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that certain kinds of panels in the circuit are formed ran-
domly—e.g., panels hearing death penalty cases34—but do not
purport to randomly configure argument panels.  Others are
silent on the matter of panel configuration altogether.  That
said, the majority of the federal appellate courts do state that
they form their argument panels randomly or with a goal of
largely equalizing co-sittings.
Finally, it is worth noting that at least some of the judges
themselves have furthered the claim of randomness.  For ex-
ample, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit has stated
in his scholarship that argument panels are randomly chosen
in all of the circuit courts.35  Judge Robert Parker of the Fifth
Circuit has written that, “[e]xcept in unusual circumstances,
an appeal in our court is decided by a panel of three judges”
and that “[t]he panels are selected at random.”36  And then-
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit wrote in 2012
that the practice of dissenting from, or concurring in, orders
denying rehearings en banc can be beneficial to a judge who
was “not assign[ed] . . . to the original three-judge panel” simply
because of “the luck of the draw.”37
In short, quite a few of the federal courts of appeals and
several judges state that the process by which they form their
argument panels is a random one or that they have deliberately
formed panels in a way that should be consistent with a ran-
dom process.
34 See, e.g., U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, LOCAL RULES AND
OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, Internal
Operating Procedure 47.1(b) (2014) [hereinafter SECOND CIRCUIT, LOCAL RULES]
(“The clerk assigns judges to death penalty case panels by random drawing from
the death penalty case pool”—a pool that “consists of all active judges of the court
and those senior judges who have filed with the clerk a statement of willingness to
serve on death penalty case panels.”  The provision further states that “[i]f a judge
is unable to serve, that judge’s name returns to the pool after the drawing of a
replacement.  If a random drawing results in the selection of three senior judges,
the clerk sets aside the third senior judge’s name and continues drawing until the
selection of an active judge’s name, after which the clerk returns the third senior
judge’s name, and the names of any senior judges drawn thereafter, to the pool.”);
HOOPER, MILETICH & LEVY, supra note 17, at 87 (describing how, in the Third R
Circuit, “for each death penalty case, a special panel is constructed, and active
judges are randomly assigned to the panel”).
35 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Heartfelt, Albeit Largely Statistical Salute to
Judge Richard D. Cudahy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 357 (2012) (“[T]he panels that
hear cases are randomly selected from the court’s judges.”); see also Epstein,
Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 110 (“We assume that members of a panel are R
chosen randomly from the judges of the court, which is the practice in all cir-
cuits.” (citation omitted)).
36 Robert M. Parker, Foreword, 26 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 265, 266 (1985).
37 Alex Kozinski & James Burnham, I Say Dissental, You Say Concurral, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 601, 607 (2012).
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B. General Courts Literature
The notion that oral argument panels are randomly drawn
has been picked up in the academic literature.  Numerous arti-
cles on the federal courts have noted it.38  For some of these
scholarly works, the randomness assumption serves as a back-
drop; it helps to set the context for a particular argument.  For
others, however, the randomness assumption is more signifi-
cant, serving, at least in part, as a basis for normative
conclusions.
With respect to the first kind of scholarship, quite a few
articles include the claim that the federal appellate courts have
randomly configured argument panels.  For this set of articles,
the “fact” that the judges are randomly selected is relevant in
some way to the article’s analysis.  For example, a recent article
about the deference courts give to agency interpretation of stat-
utes discusses the random draw of three-judge panels.39  One
of the article’s claims is that judges have different views about
the degree of deference to afford a particular agency interpreta-
tion; because the three judges who hear a case are drawn at
random, the article states, the outcome of each case is akin to a
lottery.40  Similarly, an article on the meaning of dicta and the
role of stare decisis states that “[i]n the Courts of Appeals,
panels are the product of random draws of three among a
larger set of members of the court.”41  The article goes on to
argue that the randomness of panel composition creates doctri-
nal instability in the courts of appeals when compared to the
Supreme Court by increasing the chance that a panel that does
not represent the views of the court “as a whole” will decide a
particular matter.42  Finally, an article on the decentralized
nature of federal judicial power assumes random assignment
and finds it to be a useful feature of the system in that it helps
to avoid various problems associated with group decision mak-
ing, such as group polarization and herding.43  In articles such
38 For just a few examples, see Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election
Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 433, 452 (describing how judges are
“randomly selected” to hear cases on review); Samuel P. Jordan, Early Panel
Announcement, Settlement, and Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 55, 66–67 (noting
“the current practice of randomly assigning judges to appellate panels”).
39 See Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1373 (2013).
40 Id. at 1372–76.
41 Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 1, at 1009. R
42 Id. at 1009–10.
43 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Unitary Executive and the Plural Judiciary:
On the Potential Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1021, 1073 (2014) (“Random assignment of judges to panels means that sub-
groups of the entire court are constituted to hear and decide particular cases.
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as these, the assumption of random panels helps to create a
context for the underlying analysis.
There is a second set of court scholarship, however, that
relies more directly on the claim that panels are randomly cre-
ated.  This scholarship assumes that argument panels are ran-
domly configured and argues that the current system should
be changed.  Noted federal courts scholar Daniel Meador pro-
posed creating appellate panels designed to specialize in cer-
tain subjects—a “method of appellate organization” which
would “eliminate” what he took to be the status quo: “random
assignments of judges and cases.”44  In a similar vein, Emerson
Tiller and Frank Cross noted that random panel assignment
has become a “hallmark” of our current federal system,45 but
then advocated abandoning it in favor of a selection process
whereby no more than two judges of the same political party
could be put on the same panel.46  Finally, Michael Hasday
wrote that “[f]ederal appellate courts employ a random assign-
ment system to select the circuit judges who will serve on any
particular three-judge panel” and then argued for allowing the
parties to create oral argument panels instead.47  In short, an
important conclusion of these articles is that the assignment of
judges to panels should not be random, after it is stated that it
is.
In sum, there is a widespread belief in the general courts
literature that the oral argument panels of the federal courts
are randomly configured.  For some scholarship, this “fact” is
noted in passing.  Elsewhere, however, the randomness as-
sumption is important—it sets the context for, and helps to
support, a given argument.  For yet other articles, the random-
ness assumption plays a direct role, as it is the taken status
quo that the authors argue against.  We turn now to a final set
of scholarship in which the randomness assumption plays a
crucial role: the empirical literature on courts and judicial deci-
sion making.
Different judges will bring different predilections (biases) to the table, but the size
of most of the U.S. courts of appeals would seem helpful in avoiding problems
associated with choice shift, group polarization, and herding.” (footnote omitted)).
44 Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through
Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 471, 475 (1983).
45 Tiller & Cross, supra note 2, at 216 & n.4. R
46 Id. at 226–32.
47 Michael Hasday, Ending the Reign of Slot Machine Justice, 57 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 291, 291, 298–99 (2000).
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C. Empirical Literature
Scholars have long recognized the importance of
randomization for causal inference in research generally, as
well as in empirical legal scholarship specifically.48  The reason
is simple: when a variable of interest is not randomly assigned,
it might be correlated with the outcome scholars are interested
in studying.49  For example, if students self-select into LSAT
prep courses, simply showing that students who took the
course score better on the LSAT does not demonstrate that the
course is effective.  This is because students who select to take
the class might be more conscientious students than those
who do not.  In other words, the treatment (taking the course)
is systematically related to the outcome variable (LSAT scores).
If a large number of students were randomly assigned to take
an LSAT prep-course, however, any difference in test results
between those students who took the course and those who did
not could be attributed to the course.
Given the importance of randomization to causal inference,
empirical researchers often rely heavily on random processes
to design their studies.  To do so, scholars may either conduct
experiments where they are able to guarantee the random as-
signment of treatments,50 or they find examples where random
processes were already used even without intervention from
the researcher.51  One random process that is frequently relied
on as the basis for empirical research is the random assign-
ment of judges on the federal courts of appeals to argument
panels.52
48 See Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin, Credible Causal Inference for Empiri-
cal Legal Studies, 7 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 17, 18 (2011) (citing R.A. FISHER,
STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH WORKERS (1925); R.A. FISHER, THE DESIGN OF
EXPERIMENTS (1935)).
49 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 110 (2002) (“[R]andom selection is the only selection mechanism in large-n
studies that automatically guarantees the absence of selection bias. That is be-
cause when we use random sampling we are, by definition, assuring the absence
of any association that may exist between selection rules and the variables in our
study.” (emphasis omitted)).
50 For a discussion of experimental research by legal scholars, see Adam
Chilton & Dustin Tingley, Why the Study of International Law Needs Experiments,
52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 173, 187–90 (2013).
51 For a discussion of these so-called “natural experiments,” see Gregory
Robinson, John E. McNulty & Jonathan S. Krasno, Observing the Counterfactual?
The Search for Political Experiments in Nature, 17 POL. ANALYSIS 341 (2009); Jasjeet
S. Sekhon & Rocı́o Titiunik, When Natural Experiments Are Neither Natural nor
Experiments, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 35 (2012).
52 Claims that panels are randomly assigned are ubiquitous in empirical
research on judicial behavior. See, e.g., Andreas Broscheid, Comparing Circuits:
Are Some U.S. Courts of Appeals More Liberal or Conservative Than Others?, 45 L.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 15  2-NOV-15 13:05
2015] CHALLENGING THE RANDOMNESS 15
The reason that the randomness assumption is helpful is
that it allows researchers to assume that the judges on panels
do not correlate with any salient features of the judges or the
cases.  For example, researchers have relied on the random
assignment of judges to test whether judges vote differently
when they are assigned to panels with judges who were ap-
pointed by a president from the same (or different) political
party.53  Similarly, scholars have studied whether the presence
of a female judge on a panel alters the decisions of judges,54 or
whether the presence of a judge that is a racial minority alters
& SOC’Y REV. 171, 179 (2011) (“In general, in the U.S. Courts of Appeals three-
judge panels are formed by random selection from the pool of sitting circuit
judges, and the cases they hear are randomly assigned to panels.”); Edward K.
Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 523 (2008) (“[W]ell-
established rules and norms within the courts of general jurisdiction require the
random assignment of cases to ensure that judges see all case types.” (footnote
omitted)); Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 110 (“We assume that R
members of a panel are chosen randomly from the judges of the court, which is
the practice in all circuits.” (citation omitted)); Todd C. Peppers, Katherine Vigi-
lante & Christopher Zorn, Random Chance or Loaded Dice: The Politics of Judicial
Designation, 10 U. N.H. L. REV. 69, 74 (2012) (“It is especially important to note
that each federal circuit follows strict procedures designed to guarantee that
appellate judges are randomly selected to each three-judge panel, and that cases
are randomly assigned to those panels.” (footnote omitted)); Sunstein & Miles,
supra note 1, at 2197 (noting that within the federal courts of appeals, “judges are R
randomly assigned to three-judge panels”); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade &
Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Prelimi-
nary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 303 (2004) (noting, after posing a series of
questions related to how ideology affects voting behavior, that “[s]ince judges in a
given circuit are assigned to panels (and, therefore, to cases) randomly, the exis-
tence of a large data set allows these issues to be investigated empirically”).
53 There have been a large number of these papers in this “panel effects”
literature. See, e.g., Sunstein & Miles, supra note 1; Sunstein, Schkade & Ell- R
man, supra note 52. R
54 See Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the
Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 390 (2010) (“[I]n cases
implicating sex discrimination . . . we observe sex-based effects: the probability of
a judge deciding in favor of the party alleging discrimination decreases . . . when
the judge is a male.  Likewise, when a woman serves on a panel with men, the men
are significantly more likely to rule in favor of the rights litigant.”); Sean Farhang
& Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority
Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 299
(2004) (“We find that the norm of unanimity on panels grants women influence
over outcomes even when they are outnumbered on a panel.”); Donald R. Songer,
Sue Davis & Susan Haire, A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal Courts:
Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425, 425 (1994) (“[I]n employ-
ment discrimination cases, female judges were significantly more liberal than
their male colleagues.”); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender
and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759,
1776 (2005) (“[I]n Title VII sexual harassment and sex discrimination cases, . . . a
judge’s gender and the gender composition of the panel mattered to a judge’s
decision.”).
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the decisions of judges.55  Additionally, scholars have leveraged
the assumption that judges are randomly assigned to study
aspects of judicial behavior other than voting on case out-
comes, like which judges will write the majority opinion,56
whether judges will decide to file a dissenting opinion,57 and
even the choice of words used in opinions.58  In short, the
random assignment of judges to panels on the courts of ap-
peals is both frequently assumed and a key feature of empirical
research strategies studying judicial behavior.
Although the randomness assumption has been relied
upon by empirical researchers in numerous articles, it is im-
portant to note that a few scholars have questioned “random
assignment” or “judicial assignment” more generally—that is,
the overall process by which judges are assigned to panels and
those panels are then assigned to cases.  For example, in a
2000 article on the assignment of judges to cases in the federal
appellate courts, J. Robert Brown, Jr. and Allison Herren Lee
describe how there are various ways in which the “random-
ness” of case assignment is “erode[d],” including how judges
are able to change panels even after cases have been as-
signed.59  Although these comments are meant to show how
the ultimate case assignment is not perfectly random, they also
call into question the randomness of panel configuration.  In
55 See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (“[T]he so-called ‘panel effects’ of race are strong, as
white judges become substantially more likely to vote in favor of liability when
they sit with minority judges.”); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology
and the Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493,
1536 (2008) (“White judges who sat on panels with at least one African-American
judge were considerably more likely to vote in favor of liability, and this effect was
evident for both Democratic and Republican appointees.”); Jonathan P. Kastellec,
Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167,
167 (2012) (“Randomly assigning a black counterjudge—a black judge sitting with
two nonblack judges—to a three-judge panel of the Courts of Appeals nearly
ensures that the panel will vote in favor of an affirmative action program.”).
56 See, e.g., Sean Farhang, Jonathan P. Kastellec & Gregory J. Wawro, The
Politics of Opinion Assignment and Authorship on the US Court of Appeals: Evi-
dence from Sexual Harassment Cases, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S59, S59 (2015) (“[We]
find that female and more liberal judges are substantially more likely to write
opinions in sexual harassment cases.”).
57 See Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 110. R
58 See Michael Z. Gill & Andrew B. Hall, How Judicial Identity Changes the
Text of Legal Rulings 14 (June 19, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (“[T]he ran-
dom assignment of a female or non-white judge systematically causes an overall
change in the vocabulary used in published rulings.”).
59 See Brown & Lee, supra note 4, at 1041–42; see also Kastellec, supra note R
55, at 175 n.14 (“The actual procedures employed for panel assignment vary R
across circuits and allow for some discretion in panel selection, which mitigates
against truly random selection.”).
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describing the general assignment process, other scholars have
similarly noted that judges may subsequently trade panel
placements with each other or that a judge may be placed on a
panel purposely to rehear a case if she was on the original
panel that decided the case.60  Again, while these articles do
not directly question the randomness of oral argument panel
configuration, their statements indirectly question the
assumption.
The scholarly work that comes closest to directly question-
ing the randomness of panel creation is a 2009 article by politi-
cal scientist Matthew Hall on the Supreme Court’s review of
appellate court decisions.61  Hall notes that while conducting
his research a few years prior, he called each federal court of
appeals’ Clerk’s Office to ask whether judicial assignments—
meaning judges to panels and then panels to cases—were ran-
dom.62  Hall reports that several clerks informed him that as-
signments were not in fact random in their circuits, and as a
consequence he excluded those circuits from his study.63  It is
not clear just what was confirmed to be nonrandom—the panel
configuration process, the assignment of panels to cases, or
both.  In any event, Hall’s claims about random assignment
have been noted by at least some scholars.64  That said, we are
unaware of any studies that have followed Hall’s lead and tried
to verify whether panel configuration is actually random.
Moreover, Hall’s article has actually been cited by prominent
scholars for the proposition that “members of a panel are cho-
sen randomly from the judges of the court, which is the prac-
tice in all circuits.”65
In short, scores of quantitative articles have not only as-
sumed the random configuration of panels, but have relied
60 See, e.g., Kastellec, supra note 55, at 175 n.14 (“[J]udges can trade places R
on panels in some circuits, and the original judges in a case that requires addi-
tional hearings may be selected for such subsequent hearings.”).
61 See Matthew Hall, Experimental Justice: Random Judicial Assignment and
the Partisan Process of Supreme Court Review, 37 AM. POL. RES. 195 (2009).
62 Id. at 202–03.
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Bargaining and Legal Develop-
ment in the United States Courts of Appeals, 41 AM. POL. RES. 1071, 1096 n.3 (“Not
all circuits randomly assign judges to panels, though most today do.” (citing Hall,
supra note 61)).  Interestingly, Black and Owens rely on Hall’s research to verify R
that the D.C. Circuit—the focus of their study—used random assignment. Id.
Hall bases his claim that the D.C. Circuit uses random assignment on what the
Clerk’s Office in the D.C. Circuit reported but did not make any independent effort
to verify the claim. See Hall, supra note 61, at 203.  Our research, however, found R
evidence of nonrandomness in the D.C. Circuit. See infra Subpart III.A.
65 Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 110 (citing Hall, supra note 61). R
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upon this assumption directly in their research design.  Al-
though a few researchers have questioned the randomness of
how judges are ultimately assigned to cases, we believe it is fair
to say that random assignment of judges to panels remains the
dominant view in the literature.
II
CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTION OF RANDOM PANELS
Although the assumption that panels are randomly gener-
ated in the courts of appeals is both widely held and critical to
scholarship on federal courts and judicial behavior, there are
good reasons to believe that it might not be strictly accurate.  In
conducting qualitative research on the practices of the federal
courts of appeals, one of the coauthors learned of several im-
portant reasons why a court might want, if not need, to create
panels in a non-strictly random fashion.66  For example, in a
circuit that does not have specific court weeks set aside for oral
arguments, judges may have scheduling conflicts that need to
be accommodated or it be may helpful to ensure that judges
have at least some number of weeks between sittings so as not
to become overloaded.  Taking such considerations into ac-
count would require departures from strict randomness,
though they are the kinds of departures most would under-
stand if not expect courts to make.  Moreover, even if strict
randomness were the goal, this same coauthor was informed
that there is no standardized process for creating random
panels and that some circuits put together the panels by
human hand.67  As discussed more below, research has shown
that individuals, as much as they might try, have a difficult
time creating results that are consistent with a random pro-
cess.  Accordingly, there is good reason to think that at least
some of the calendars will not be random—either because vari-
ous factors, such as scheduling needs, were taken into account
or because the relevant human actors were unable to perfectly
create random panels.
Despite the fact that there are plausible reasons to doubt
it, the assumption that panels are randomly created has not
yet been subject to rigorous empirical scrutiny.  One reason, as
intimated above, is that many scholars and researchers seem
to be unaware of the extent to which there is discretion in
calendar creation and the various needs that a court may face;
66 See Levy, supra note 13. R
67 See id.
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as such, scholars have not sufficiently appreciated the reasons
to doubt randomness.  The other reason is methodological—
testing the randomness of panel assignments is quite challeng-
ing.  First, in order to test random assignment, one must de-
velop a specific testable hypothesis to evaluate a way in which
the composition of panels would deviate from randomness.
Second, testing whether panels were randomly created re-
quires having data on the panels that actually sat.  Although
case level data is publicly available in a number of commercial
and government databases, the argument calendars for the
federal appellate courts are not centrally collected or easily
available.  Third, of course any individual composition of
panels is highly unlikely, and so determining whether panel
assignments are random requires determining some baseline
distribution of what panels would be expected through a ran-
dom process and testing the observed panels against this
baseline.
In this Part, we first outline several reasons to doubt the
assumption of random panel assignment.  Second, we develop
a hypothesis to test whether the composition of panels might
be nonrandom.  Third, we describe the original dataset that we
have constructed for this project.  Fourth, we explain our meth-
odology for empirically testing random assignment of circuit
court panels.
A. Motivation
While conducting qualitative research on the federal courts
of appeals, one of the coauthors was informed that different
circuits have different ways of creating panels.68  As one exam-
ple, a sitting circuit court judge noted that in his circuit the
calendar had to take into account practical concerns, such as
the availability of judges, and that accordingly the panels were
not configured by computer but by hand.69  These comments
led to a significant qualitative project, which is still ongoing.70
But the initial findings from five circuit courts substantiate this
judge’s statements that there are good reasons to think that
the circuits take into account considerations about the sched-
ules of various judges or other circuit interests that would
mean creating a calendar in a non-strictly random fashion.
Grown out of an effort to balance these various factors, at least
several circuits rely on individuals, instead of a computer pro-
68 Id. at 17–30.
69 Id. at 22.
70 See generally id.
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gram, to create their oral argument panels.71  We briefly con-
sider these points here and how they create reasons to doubt
the widely held assumption of random panels.
To begin, the initial findings of the coauthor’s qualitative
study suggest that at least some of the courts of appeals might
take into account a variety of factors when creating the oral
argument panel.72  These factors could be specific to one
judge—such as Judge A will be away from court in a particular
month and so should not be scheduled for that month.73  These
factors could also be more general to the court74—such as the
circuit believing it important to ensure that each judge have at
least a few weeks off between sittings, if possible, and so Judge
B will not be scheduled to sit for the second week in October if
she has already been scheduled to sit for the first.  It is easy to
see how a court would take such considerations into account
when creating its panels, and therefore there is good reason to
think that at least some of the courts would not have a strictly
random calendar.
Additionally, at least several of the circuit courts rely on
people, and not computers, to create the oral argument
panels.75  As a result, even if the circuits wanted to achieve
strictly random panels, it is highly unlikely that they would be
able to do so.  This is because, as a large body of academic
research has shown, “humans have difficulties reproduc-
ing . . . random patterns, even when they have incentives to do
so.”76  A great deal of this literature has focused on conducting
experiments in laboratories showing that human subjects
asked to create patterns of random numbers have quite a few
nonrandom tendencies—like using certain numbers at higher
rates than others, favoring small numbers over large numbers,
or not repeating the same number consecutively.77  In fact,
71 Id. at 21–30.
72 See id.
73 See, e.g., id. at 21–23.
74 See, e.g., id. at 24–30 (listing, based on interviews with federal circuit
judges, a range of possible rationales for creating calendars in a non-strictly
random fashion).
75 Id. at 22.
76 Bernd Beber & Alexandra Scacco, What the Numbers Say: A Digit-Based
Test for Election Fraud, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 211, 218–20 (2012) (providing an excel-
lent discussion of research on errors made by humans attempting to replicate
random processes).
77 See Philip J. Boland & Kevin Hutchinson, Student Selection of Random
Digits, 49 STATISTICIAN 519, 527 (2000) (“Our results support the claim that
humans are unable to generate random sequences even when explicitly asked to
do so.”); Alphonse Chapanis, Random-Number Guessing Behavior, 8 AM. PSYCHOL-
OGIST 332, 332 (1953) (“With but one exception, [the human subjects] exhibited
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even in experiments where subjects are paid more if they are
able to effectively randomize, the human subjects are still not
able to recreate random processes.78
These findings, moreover, are not limited to laboratories.
There is also considerable evidence that humans are unable to
create random results when they are trying hard to do so and
have strong incentives to produce random-looking outcomes.
For example, researchers have been caught fabricating data
because the data they produced was highly unlikely to have
occurred randomly.79  Additionally, humans’ inability to re-
create random patterns has been used as a method of detecting
election fraud because humans are neither capable of recreat-
ing random vote counts80 nor counts of voter turnout.81  Given
this consistent evidence that humans are incapable of recreat-
ing random processes, it seems possible—if not highly proba-
ble—that the presence of human discretion over how panels
are created in the courts of appeals would mean that the panels
would not be random, regardless of how much the courts might
want them to be.
Taken together, the initial results of the qualitative re-
search provide reasons to question the randomness assump-
marked preferences for certain digits . . . .”); Gustave J. Rath, Randomization by
Humans, 79 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 97, 102 (1996) (“[Human subjects] are poor
randomizers, as has been found in other studies.”); see also Beber & Scacco,
supra note 76, at 218–20. R
78 Beber & Scacco, supra note 76, at 219; see David V. Budescu, A Markov R
Model for Generation of Random Binary Sequences, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 25,
37–38 (1987); James E. Mosimann, Claire V. Wiseman & Ruth E. Edelman, Data
Fabrication: Can People Generate Random Digits?, 4 ACCOUNTABILITY RES. 31,
42–44 (1995); Amnon Rapoport & David V. Budescu, Randomization in Individual
Choice Behavior, 104 PSYCHOL. REV. 603, 612, 614 (1997).
79 See, e.g., Sanaa Al-Marzouki, Stephen Evans, Tom Marshall & Ian Roberts,
Are These Data Real? Statistical Methods for the Detection of Data Fabrication in
Clinical Trials, 331 BRIT. MED. J. 267, 270 (2005) (concluding data in a diet trial
that supposedly relied upon randomized intervention “were either fabricated or
falsified”); James E. Mosimann, John E. Dahlberg, Nancy M. Davidian & John W.
Krueger, Terminal Digits and the Examination of Questioned Data, 9 ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY RES. 75, 79, 82–83, 87, 92 (2002) (identifying four cases of falsified data that
others had portrayed as random).
80 Beber & Scacco, supra note 76, at 219; Walter R. Mebane, Jr., Election R
Forensics: The Second-Digit Benford’s Law Test and Recent American Presidential
Elections, in ELECTION FRAUD: DETECTING AND DETERRING ELECTORAL MANIPULATION
162, 165–68 (R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall & Susan D. Hyde eds., 2008)
(developing a test for voter fraud with “counts generated using some simple ran-
dom process”).
81 Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook & Dimitry Shakin, Fraud or
Fairytales: Russia and Ukraine’s Electoral Experience, 21 POST-SOVIET AFF. 91,
126–30 (2005); Misha Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook & Dmitry Shakin, The Disap-
pearance of Fraud: The Forensics of Ukraine’s 2006 Parliamentary Elections, 23
POST-SOVIET AFF. 218, 226–27 (2007).
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tion.  There are numerous factors a court might
understandably want to take into account when creating
panels that would cause departures from randomness.  Moreo-
ver, even if that were not the case, simply because of human
involvement in at least some of the courts, it seems unlikely
that all of the panels in the circuit courts would be strictly
random.  As such, we concluded that it was important to quan-
titatively test the randomness of the panels of the courts of
appeals.
B. Hypothesis
Before testing whether panel assignments are random,
there is a threshold question of what significant characteristic
should, in theory, be randomly distributed if the assignment
process is a random one.  For example, in experimental re-
search, it is common practice to make sure that treatments are
randomly assigned across subjects in the sample being stud-
ied.82  This is done by testing whether subjects in the control
group have the same relevant characteristics as subjects in the
treatment groups.  This may include checking to make sure
that groups have the same ratio of men to women, the same
education levels, or the same racial breakdown.83  Although
the specific characteristics evaluated may change based on the
subject being studied, the key is that relevant variables must
be identified to evaluate random assignment in an experimen-
tal setting.
In testing random assignment in the federal appellate
courts, there were several criteria we kept in mind in selecting
the relevant judicial characteristic.  First, we wanted to select a
characteristic that was easily observable.  It may be that testing
the randomness of panel assignment based on the judges’ in-
ternal preferences—say, about supporting the business com-
munity—would be interesting, but it would be impossible
without access to this kind of information.  Second, it was im-
portant to select a characteristic that must be objectively de-
fined.  For example, if we were to test the distribution of “new”
judges, we could decide to define judges as being “new” in their
82 See Ben B. Hansen & Jake Bowers, Covariate Balance in Simple, Stratified
and Clustered Comparative Studies, 23 STAT. SCI. 219, 219 (2008) (“In a con-
trolled, randomized experiment, treatment and control groups should be roughly
the same—balanced—in their distribution of pretreatment variables.”).
83 See, e.g., Stephen Chaudoin, Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analy-
sis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions, 68 INT’L ORG. 235, 242
(2014) (checking to make sure that the treatment and control groups are balanced
based on the respondents age, sex, race, marital status, and education level).
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first year or in their first five years on the bench.  This injects a
subjective decision into the process that, depending on how it
was made, could influence the results.  Third, because it is
difficult to evaluate whether a characteristic with little variance
is randomly distributed, the characteristic must have a great
deal of variance.  For example, one could test the distribution of
judges who have last names ending in “Z,” but as this would be
such a small number of judges,84 assessing whether the panels
appeared random along this dimension would be quite chal-
lenging.  Finally, we wanted to select a characteristic that is
relevant to the academic literature.  For example, one could
test the distribution of judges that wear eyeglasses—a charac-
teristic that satisfies all of the other criteria listed above—and
yet, the results of such a study would be of limited value.  That
is, if it turned out that panels appeared nonrandom based on
this measure, the finding of nonrandomness would be impor-
tant but it is not clear what more could be said; a more valua-
ble study would then have a characteristic that is theoretically
important.
A characteristic that meets all four criteria—and the one
we elected to test—is the ideology of judges assigned to
panels.85  More specifically, we elected to test whether the dis-
tribution of judges based on the political party of the president
that appointed them was random.  The party of the president
that appointed a judge is easily observable, objectively defined,
has a great deal of variance, and is theoretically important.
84 Out of the over 775 judges in our study, only six have last names beginning
with the letter “Z”: Judges James Block Zagel, Lawrence Paul Zatkoff, Thomas
Samuel Zilly, Jennifer Guerin Zipps, Rya Weickert Zobel, and Jack Zouhary.
85 An earlier draft of this project also tested the gender balance of panels and
the balance of minority judges on panels.  We no longer test the balance of these
characteristics because there are relatively few women and minorities serving as
federal judges. See Barry J. McMillion, U.S. Circuit and District Court Judges:
Profile of Select Characteristics, CONG. RES. SERV., 12 (Mar. 19, 2014), https://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43426.pdf [http://perma.cc/J9TN-4VKV]
(“[W]omen comprise 32.1% of active U.S. circuit court judges and 10.5% of senior
status circuit judges . . . .”); id. at 14 (“[C]ircuit court judges who are white
account for 76.5% of all active judges and 90.3% of senior judges.”); id. at 21
(“31.8% of active U.S. district court judges are women . . . .  12.8% of senior
district court judges currently serving are women.”); id. at 22 (“74.4% of active
district court judges are white . . . . Of senior district court judges, 89.5% are
white . . . .”).  This poses a problem because our method for testing for
nonrandomness—using a chi-squared test—requires that all of the “bins” have
counts higher than five. See ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT &
THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 258–260 (2010).  Many of the circuits
had fewer than five total panels with three women or three minorities on the
panel, thus making it inappropriate to use our method to test whether panel
assignments are random along these dimensions.
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On the last point in particular, as noted already, there is a
large body of empirical research demonstrating that the ideol-
ogy of judges—most often defined by the party of the ap-
pointing president—has an influence on the decisions of judges
and panels.86  Much of this research has relied on the assump-
tion that the ideological composition of panels is random.
For these reasons, the hypothesis we test is whether the
distribution of judges appointed by Republican presidents is
consistent with the distribution produced by a strictly random
process.
C. Data
In order to test whether the ideological composition of
panels is random, we created a dataset based on the oral argu-
ment panels of all of the twelve regional circuit courts87 during
the five-year span between September 1, 2008, and August 31,
2013.  Over the course of a year, we were fortunate enough to
86 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALY-
SIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); Deborah Beim & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The
Interplay of Ideological Diversity, Dissents, and Discretionary Review in the Judi-
cial Hierarchy: Evidence from Death Penalty Cases, 76 J. POL. 1074, 1074,
1081–82 (2014) (“[T]he existence of ideological diversity on a panel—and the po-
tential for dissent—plays a significant role in judicial decision making.”);
Jonathan P. Kastellec, Hierarchical and Collegial Politics on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 73 J. POL. 345, 356–59 (2011) (finding that having one judge from a
political party on a panel has the greatest effect when that judge is aligned with
the political ideology of the Supreme Court); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Compo-
sition and Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Over Time, 62 POL. RES. Q. 377,
381–85 (2011) (studying the ideological compositions of panels over time and
finding that the relationship between panel composition and judicial behavior is a
relatively recent phenomenon); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges
Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
823, 823, 827 (2007) (“Republican appointees demonstrated a greater willingness
to invalidate liberal agency decisions and those of Democratic administrations.
These differences are greatly amplified when Republican appointees sit with two
Republican appointees and when Democratic appointees sit with two Democratic
appointees.”); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrari-
ness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 767, 785 (2008) (finding “panel effects are
substantial” when examining the invalidation of agency rulemaking: “Democratic
appointees typically show increasingly liberal voting patterns as the number of
Democratic appointees [on a panel] increases, and Republican appointees typi-
cally show increasingly conservative voting patterns as the number of Republican
appointees increases.”); Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 52, at 304–05
(“A judge’s ideological tendency . . . is likely to be amplified if she is sitting with
two judges from the same political party.”); Tiller & Cross, supra note 2, at 226–32 R
(examining “the frequency of partisan dominance . . . on federal circuit court
panels and the benefits of requiring split partisan assignments”).
87 We define the “regional circuit courts” as consisting of the First through
Eleventh Circuits and the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.
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be given the calendar information by each individual court.88
To our knowledge, no dataset like this has ever been amassed.
Regarding the substance of the data, for the most part
what we received were calendar pages from each court.89  A
typical page would list the sitting date, the location of the sit-
ting, the three judges who heard the case, and sometimes the
case name.90  Less typically, we received a page that listed all of
the panels as they existed for a week, without any case infor-
mation.91  Although most of the pages were fairly straightfor-
ward to interpret, we corresponded with nearly every Clerk’s
Office to be sure that our understanding of the relevant dates
and panels was accurate.
Regarding the form of the data, we typically received a se-
ries of PDF documents of the calendar pages (though on one
occasion we received a hard copy of the circuit’s calendar
pages).  In total, the calendar pages for all twelve courts for this
five-year time period translated into several thousand pages of
information.  In order to extract the data accurately, code was
written to parse the individual calendar pages and pull the
relevant information (such as the names of the judges and the
sitting date).92  In two of the circuit courts—the Third and the
Fifth—code extraction proved impossible, due to the formatting
of the calendar pages, and so hand-coding and entry was
used.93  From these sources, we were able to create our
dataset, which contains approximately ten thousand panels
across all circuits in this time frame.  One coauthor then per-
formed a verification process on the data, spot-checking be-
tween 10% and 20% of all panels in the code-extracted
88 Some circuits provide past calendar information online, but this informa-
tion is typically for a short time frame (say, the past six months, year, or two years
at most). See, e.g., U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, Court Calendar,
http://ww2.ca2.uscourts.gov/calendar/ [http://perma.cc/U9QH-DSV2] (provid-
ing court calendars only as far in the past as August 2013).  The only exception to
this general rule at the time of this Article’s writing is the Ninth Circuit, which
provides several years worth of calendar information on its court website. See
U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, Oral Argument Dates & Locations, http://
www.ca9.uscourts.gov/calendar/ [http://perma.cc/U9QH-DSV2].  But in order
to obtain the information for our full time frame, we were in touch with the Clerk’s
Office directly for each of the circuit courts.
89 These calendar pages are on file with the authors.
90 See, for example, a calendar page of the D.C. Circuit, the First Circuit, or
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  These calendar pages are on file with the
authors.
91 See, for example, the calendar pages of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
These calendar pages are on file with the authors.
92 We owe a debt of gratitude to Sean Chen for this work.
93 With many thanks to Jacob Adrian for this work.
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circuits,94 and 100% of all panels in the hand-extracted cir-
cuits.  Due to these processes, we are confident that we accu-
rately captured the panels as we received them during this time
period.
A few qualifications about the data should be noted.  First,
the data we obtained speaks only to oral argument panels.  As
such, it does not speak to cases that were decided by nonargu-
ment panels, which have different configuration rules.95  As
noted earlier, the majority of cases that are decided on the
merits are not decided with oral argument.96  That said, the
literatures—both the general courts literature and the empiri-
cal literature—have focused upon the cases decided by oral
argument, presumably because such cases are generally un-
derstood to be the cases that the courts deem to be important,
particularly complex, or novel.97  Moreover, the courts of ap-
peals have focused on these panels as well (the courts say
virtually nothing in their internal operating procedures or local
rules about how their nonargument panels are formed).98
Given that the focus of the academic literatures and the courts
themselves has been on the oral argument panels, and not
simply panels generally, we think it is reasonable to focus on
such panels.
Second, we relied upon the data that we received from each
circuit and the circuits occasionally gave us different kinds of
information.  For example, the Eleventh Circuit provided the
general argument panel data exclusive of capital cases,
whereas other circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit, did include
capital cases in their data.  Some of these inconsistencies we
were able to cure by reaching out to the relevant Clerk’s Office
and asking for additional data, but this was not possible in
94 If anything, the ten-to-twenty percent verification figure underestimates
the spot-checking that we performed.  One of the coauthors went through the data
by hand, counting out every ten panels and checking that panel against the panel
that had been extracted.  As such, the process not only directly checked every
tenth panel but also indirectly checked the panels in-between (as, if there was an
extra panel in the original data, it was then caught).  Accordingly, it would not be
inaccurate to say that our verification process indirectly checked all of the panels
in our time frame.
95 See Levy, supra note 13. R
96 See supra note 15. R
97 See JUDITH A. MCKENNA ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE MANAGEMENT PROCE-
DURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 10 (2000) (noting that certain case char-
acteristics are “likely to trigger oral argument,” including “novel issues, complex
issues, extensive records, and numerous parties”).
98 See, e.g., SECOND CIRCUIT, LOCAL RULES, supra note 34, at Local Rule 34.2 R
(listing the local rules governing the Non-Argument Calendar without identifying
the procedure for how nonargument panels are formed).
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every instance.  The remaining kinds of discrepancies between
circuits are minor and we believe only amount to a small num-
ber of cases.
Third, based on limitations with our data, we were not able
to consistently identify what constituted a “draw” of a panel for
each circuit.  For example, some circuits may draw a panel and
then have those judges sit together for one morning, but other
circuits may draw a panel and then have those judges sit to-
gether for three days.  Ideally, we would be able to consistently
identify these draws from the data itself.  The reality, however,
was dramatically more complicated.  For example, in some
cases two judges would sit together for multiple days, but have
a different third judge each day.  Or the same set of three
judges would hear cases several days apart, with those judges
sitting with different judges during the days in-between.  Ulti-
mately, we defined a panel as a group of three judges who sat to
hear cases during a particular session of court on a particular
day.  Accordingly, if three judges were listed as hearing a set of
cases at 9:00 a.m. and then later at 1:00 p.m., even on the
same day, we would count this grouping as two separate
panels.  This approach seemed consistent with the interpreta-
tion of most circuits.  However, some circuits had different
measurement units.  As a result, the fact that we were unable
to identify what constituted a “draw” for each circuit, and in-
stead relied upon this proxy, certainly has the potential to bias
our results.  To guard against this concern, we also perform
our analysis using an alternative definition of panels as a ro-
bustness check in subpart III.B.
Finally, our data is based on panels as they actually sat
and not how they were originally scheduled.  Within each cir-
cuit, though practices vary, typically the calendar will be set for
some time period—say, the following six months or even term—
well in advance of the actual sittings.99  Inevitably, there will be
some last-minute adjustments to the calendar, as judges have
scheduling conflicts or other reasons for not being able to sit on
a particular date.  The data that we received from each circuit
was of the sittings as they actually occurred, and we decided
that this was the relevant data on the ground that scholarship
on judicial behavior relies on assuming that the judges who
actually heard a case were randomly chosen.  Accordingly,
even if it was possible to tell in one circuit that Judge D was
99 See, e.g., HOOPER, MILETICH & LEVY, supra note 17, at 79 (noting that in the R
Second Circuit “[t]he chief judge selects the panels for the year before the start of
the term”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 28  2-NOV-15 13:05
28 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1
actually scheduled for a day and was replaced at the last mo-
ment by Judge E—as it occasionally was—we recorded the
panel as a sitting with Judge E.  In a related vein, some circuits
occasionally had panels switch one or two members partway
through the day.  That is, every so often one would see the
following on a calendar page: Judges F, G, and H sat to hear
several cases on a given day and then Judge I replaced Judge H
for only one case, presumably because of a case-specific
recusal.  Rather than try to determine what panels were sched-
uled originally, which would have been impossible across all
circuits, we decided to code both panels as unique panels.  In
short, we coded only the panels that sat and all of the panels
that sat.
Using these approaches, we amassed the data from the
oral argument panels from all twelve circuits in this time frame.
The number of panels by term for each circuit is presented in
Table 1.  As Table 1 shows, although the number of panels
formed in each circuit is fairly stable from term to term, there is
considerable variation across circuits.100  Most notably, only
298 oral argument panels were formed in the First Circuit over
this five-year period, but 2301 panels were formed in the Ninth
Circuit in the same time frame.101  This variation is consistent
with the fact that the courts of appeals generally hear different
numbers of appeals each year based on the size of their docket
and the circuit norms about what kinds of cases should receive
oral argument.102
100 See infra Table 1.
101 See infra Table 1.
102 See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 355–60, 366–75 (2011).
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TABLE 1. TOTAL NUMBER OF PANELS BY TERM
  Term  
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
D.C. Circuit 115 99 102 96 98 510 
1st Circuit 65 59 59 54 61 298 
2nd Circuit 294 248 254 266 270 1,332 
3rd Circuit 134 140 132 135 128 669 
4th Circuit 115 112 104 132 134 597 
5th Circuit 197 174 173 154 179 877 
6th Circuit 252 233 236 260 225 1,206 
7th Circuit 137 123 125 114 110 609 
8th Circuit 174 193 168 162 144 841 
9th Circuit 450 502 469 423 457 2,301 
10th Circuit 102 89 83 80 75 429 
11th Circuit 132 139 157 139 128 695 
Total 2,167 2,111 2,062 2,015 2,009 10,364 
In addition to collecting information on the panels formed
in each circuit, we also compiled data on every judge that par-
ticipated in at least one panel during this time frame.  This
includes information on every active circuit court judge, senior
judge, and visiting judge (including active and senior district
judges and other Article III judges).
Table 2 reports the total number of judges who sat on at
least one panel during each term.  Just as with the number of
panels reported in Table 1, Table 2 shows that the number of
judges who sat on at least one panel is fairly stable from term to
term, but there is considerable variation across circuits.103  For
example, only 13 judges sat on at least one panel in the D.C.
Circuit in each term, but over 100 sat on at least one panel in
the Ninth Circuit in each term104—a discrepancy due to circuit
size and also the use of visiting judges.105
103 See infra Table 2.
104 See infra Table 2.
105 Compare HOOPER, MILETICH & LEVY, supra note 17, at 49 (“The [D.C. Circuit] R
has not used the services of visiting judges for several years.”), and id. (“The [D.C.
Circuit] has 11 [active] judgeships.”), with id. at 165 (describing the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s procedure for orienting visiting judges), and id. (“The [Ninth Circuit] has 29
authorized [active] judgeships.”).
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TABLE 2. TOTAL NUMBER OF JUDGES SITTING ON
AT LEAST ONE PANEL
  Term
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
D.C. Circuit 13 13 13 13 13 
1st Circuit 24 18 18 13 17 
2nd Circuit 63 58 47 48 58 
3rd Circuit 45 45 29 36 27 
4th Circuit 35 35 28 30 34 
5th Circuit 28 31 25 25 27 
6th Circuit 67 62 62 80 70 
7th Circuit 20 25 25 23 23 
8th Circuit 27 26 34 22 23 
9th Circuit 101 133 137 130 120 
10th Circuit 24 27 24 22 22 
11th Circuit 44 43 53 47 58 
In order to test the hypothesis laid out in Subpart II.B, as a
proxy for ideology we collected information on whether each
judge was appointed by a Republican president.106  This data
was largely compiled from a database maintained by the Fed-
eral Judicial Center.107  The exception is that complete bio-
graphical data was not available through the Federal Judicial
Center for judges of the United States Court of International
Trade,108 so for these judges we instead gathered missing bio-
graphical information by directly contacting the clerk of that
court.  Table 3 provides summary statistics for the biographical
information for judges included in our sample.109
106 We readily acknowledge that the party of the appointing president is an
imperfect proxy for whether a judge is liberal or conservative. See supra note 10. R
There have been conservative judges appointed by Democrats, and liberal judges
appointed by Republicans.  That said, using the party of the appointing president
is consistently used as a measure of ideology in the judicial behavior literature.
See supra note 10. R
107 See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 1789-
present, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/export.html [http://
perma.cc/T3YG-J4LC] (follow the “Database Export” hyperlink).
108 See id.
109 It is worth noting that Table 3 provides summary statistics using the indi-
vidual judge as the unit of observation.  In other words, 9 of the 13 judges (69%)
on the D.C. Circuit that heard at least one case were appointed by a Republican
president.  Since the judges did not all sit on the same number of panels, it does
not necessarily follow that 69% of panel spots were filled by Republican-appointed
judges.  As we discuss in Subpart II.D, infra, however, our code takes the percent-
age of panels that individual judges actually sat on into account when creating
artificial panels.
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TABLE 3. PERCENTAGE OF JUDGES APPOINTED BY A
REPUBLICAN PRESIDENT
  Term
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
D.C. Circuit 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 
1st Circuit 0.54 0.72 0.67 0.62 0.53 
2nd Circuit 0.54 0.53 0.47 0.44 0.45 
3rd Circuit 0.69 0.69 0.62 0.58 0.52 
4th Circuit 0.86 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.53 
5th Circuit 0.82 0.81 0.72 0.72 0.59 
6th Circuit 0.63 0.68 0.61 0.60 0.54 
7th Circuit 0.85 0.72 0.44 0.48 0.74 
8th Circuit 0.89 0.69 0.76 0.64 0.61 
9th Circuit 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.45 0.44 
10th Circuit 0.71 0.56 0.67 0.59 0.55 
11th Circuit 0.68 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.60 
D. Methodology
In addition to creating an original dataset for this project,
we have also written code to test for random panel assignment.
The reason that we did so is that testing for random assign-
ment of panels is not a straightforward proposition.  After all,
any combination of panel assignments is theoretically possible
when a random process is used.  For example, even if a coin is
fair, it is possible to flip heads ten times in a row—it is just
highly unlikely.  In the case of a coin flip, calculating the
probability of different combinations of flips is a fairly easy
math problem.  When there are multiple probabilistic events
occurring simultaneously—such as 13 judges being selected to
form 510 different three-judge panels in the D.C. Circuit (or
239 judges being selected to form 2301 different three-judge
panels in the Ninth Circuit!)—the math required to calculate
the probability of an event occurring becomes all but impossi-
ble fairly quickly.
In these complicated situations, one widely used approach
to calculate the probability of an event occurring randomly is
simulation.110  The basic intuition is that if you are interested
110 This approach is also commonly referred to as Monte Carlo simulation.  For
an overview of using simulation to study probability, see THOMAS M. CARSEY &
JEFFREY J. HARDEN, MONTE CARLO SIMULATION AND RESAMPLING METHODS FOR SOCIAL
SCIENCE (2014).  Monte Carlo simulation has been used in a range of legal and
social science research. See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347,
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in calculating how likely an event is to occur through a random
process, you can program a computer to complete that process
a large number of times, and then count the number of times
the event you are interested in occurred.111  For example, if you
wanted to know how likely it is to flip heads in 10 consecutive
coin tosses—and you did not feel like calculating (1/2)^10—you
could program a computer to randomly draw heads or tails 10
times, add up the number of heads, and then repeat the pro-
cess 100,000 times.  Any common laptop can complete this
process in a matter of seconds and would reveal that 10 heads
in a row should occur roughly 100 out of every 100,000 times.
This is exactly the kind of function that we have written
code to perform,112 only ours is slightly more complicated be-
cause the process we are interested in is more complicated
than coin flips.  Our code was designed to account for three key
inputs for every circuit for each term.  The first is the number of
panels that were formed in a given circuit that term.  For exam-
ple, in the 2008 term there were 115 oral argument panels
349–50, 357–64 (2012) (using Monte Carlo simulation to “construct [a]
counterfactual” for the authors’ study and noting “this technique could benefit a
large array of empirical studies facing similar constraints”); Eric D. Chason, Na-
ked and Covered in Monte Carlo: A Reappraisal of Option Taxation, 27 VA. TAX REV.
135, 172–99 (2007) (using Monte Carlo simulation to test two taxing methods);
Robert J. Franzese Jr. et al., Modeling History Dependence in Network-Behavior
Coevolution, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 175, 177–78, 187–89 (2012) (using Monte Carlo
simulation to evaluate and compare two coevolutionary strategies); Daniel E. Ho,
Foreword: Conference Bias, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 603, 603 n.1, 607 n.10 &
fig.2 (2013) (using Monte Carlo simulation to measure “publication bias”); Kate
Litvak, Monte Carlo Simulation of Contractual Provisions: An Application to Default
Provisions in Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements, 98 CORNELL L. REV.
1495, 1507–12 (2013) (using Monte Carlo simulation to, in part, “develop a simu-
lation methodology for coding the relative economic importance of contract
terms”); Michael Peress, Small Chamber Ideal Point Estimation, 17 POL. ANALYSIS
276, 276, 280–84 (2009) (using Monte Carlo simulation to prove the author’s
proposed ideal point estimator is “an improvement over conventional estimators”).
111 As Carsey and Harden explain, “the typical Monte Carlo simulation in-
volves drawing multiple random samples of data from an assumed [Data Genera-
tion Process (DGP)] that describes the unobserved process in the larger
population of how a phenomenon of interest is produced.  It is the true or real
DGP that scholars are ultimately interested in evaluating.  Of course, we rarely
know what the true DGP is in the real world—we just see the sample data it
produces.  Most of our research is about trying to uncover the underlying DGP or
test predictions that emerge from different theories about what the DGP looks
like.” CARSEY & HARDEN, supra note 110, at 6.  In our case, the Data Generation R
Process is how panels are formed, and the theory we are trying to test is whether
those panels are formed randomly.
112 All of the code we have written for our project was written in the statistical
programming environment “R.”  R is an open-source, freely available program that
is widely used in the social sciences for empirical research.  More information on
R can be found at the website for the Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN),
http://cran.r-project.org/ [http://perma.cc/N7GU-QGMQ].
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formed on the D.C. Circuit.113  The second input is all of the
judges who sat on at least one panel on that circuit during the
given term.  To continue with our example, there were 13
judges who sat on at least one oral argument panel in the D.C.
Circuit in the 2008 term.114  Finally, we input the percentage of
the total panels that each judge sat on during a given term.
That is, just like we would have to tell the computer that 50% of
coin flips should result in heads, we tell the computer that
Judge X sat on 25.21% of the oral argument panels in the D.C.
Circuit in 2008.  It is worth noting that because we draw panels
based on the percentage of panels that judges sat on, the draw-
ing of each panel is an independent event.  In other words, for
every simulation there is a 25.21% chance Judge X will be
selected for the first panel we create for the 2008 term, and
even if Judge X is selected for that panel, there is still a 25.21%
chance that he will be selected for the second panel.115
Using this information about the actual number of panels
formed and the judges who comprised them, our code then
creates one random set of panels for a given term.  Figure 1
illustrates how the code we have written completes this pro-
cess.  The basic idea is that after we have set the number of
times that a judge’s name should be included in a pool of
judges and the number of panels that need to be formed, the
computer randomly picks names from that pool to complete the
number of panels that should be formed for a given term (of
course, while including the caveat that the same judge cannot
be selected for the same panel more than once).  After the com-
113 For a complete breakdown of the number of oral argument panels formed
in each term by circuit, see supra Table 1.
114 For a complete breakdown of the number of judges who sat on at least one
oral argument panel in each term by circuit, see supra Table 2.
115 Although this may result in simulations where judges are used more times
than they actually were (e.g., Judge X appearing in 30% of panels in one simula-
tion) or fewer times than they actually were (e.g., Judge X appearing in 20% of
panels in the next simulation), over a large number of simulations the average
number of times that judges were included in panels should approach the actual
probability.  There are three reasons for conducting our simulations in this way.
First, we believe that treating each panel formation as an independent event
reflects the actual panel formation process more closely than treating the number
of panels that a given judge sat on as fixed.  Second, treating each panel formation
as an independent event allows us to evaluate whether the actual results deviate
from nonrandomness by using a chi-squared test.  This is valuable because a chi-
squared test is an intuitive and widely used method of evaluating whether an
actual distribution is different from an expected distribution in a statistically
significant way. See infra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.  Third, it is less R
computationally intense to run code that treats the formation of each panel as an
independent event where all judges are available based on their actual availability
for each simulation.
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puter has created one random set of panels for a given term
(e.g., 115 panels for the D.C. Circuit in 2008),116 we have it
count our quantity of interest: the number of judges appointed
by a Republican president on each panel.
FIGURE 1. SIMULATING RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
















































This process is then repeated for each term in the circuit
and the results are added up.  For example, there were a total
of 510 oral argument panels formed in the D.C. Circuit during
the five terms in our sample,117 and our first random draw of
510 panels resulted in: 11 panels with 0 judges appointed by a
Republican; 102 panels with 1 judge appointed by a Republi-
can; 271 panels with 2 judges appointed by a Republican; and
126 panels with 3 judges appointed by a Republican.  We then
116 See supra Table 1.
117 See supra Table 1.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 35  2-NOV-15 13:05
2015] CHALLENGING THE RANDOMNESS 35
simulate this process 100,000 times.118  This means that, in
total, we created over a billion artificial panels.119
After doing so, we can calculate the probability that the
actual panels were randomly formed by comparing the actual
panels to the simulated panels.  To do so, we use a common
approach to test whether an actual distribution is statistically
different from an expected distribution: calculating a chi-
squared test statistic.120  We specifically calculate the Pear-
son’s chi-squared test statistic to compare the actual number
of panels in each circuit with 0 Republican appointees, 1 Re-
publican appointee, 2 Republican appointees, and 3 Republi-
can appointees to the mean values produced by our
simulations.121  The test statistic can then be compared to the
118 There is no set rule on how many times simulations should be run to
produce reliable estimates, and the number 100,000 is admittedly somewhat
arbitrary.  In their book on using Monte Carlo Simulation methods, Carsey and
Harden advise:
[Determining] how many times [running a simulation] is enough is
not certain, but most simulation studies include at least 500 to
1,000 repetitions, and some include many more than that.  When
determining the number of repetitions, you have to balance the
increased precision that emerges from using a larger number of
repetitions against the amount of time it takes for the simulation to
run.
CARSEY & HARDEN, supra note 110, at 72 (footnote omitted).  As Carsey and Harden R
suggest, running 1000 simulations is a very common convention in the legal and
political science literature. See, e.g., Abrams, Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra
note 110, at 361 (“The process is then repeated 1,000 times . . . .”); Beber & R
Scacco, supra note 76, at 215 n.10 (“We simulate three runs of 1000 random R
draws from each distribution.”); Stefano M. Iacus, Gary King & Giuseppe Porro,
Multivariate Matching Methods That Are Monotonic Imbalance Bounding, 106 J.
AM. STAT. ASS’N. 345, 357 (2011) (“We generate 1000 random datasets . . . .”).  The
reason that we elected to run 100,000 simulations, however, is to be overly cau-
tious.  By running 100,000 simulations, we are able to all but eliminate the
probability that any of our results would be driven by “lucky” (or unlucky)
simulations.
119 For each simulation, we create an artificial panel for each of the 10,000
panels that actually occurred between September 2008 and August 2013.  So we
created over 10,000 panels 100,000 times (10,000 x 100,000 = 1,000,000,000) for
a total of over 1 billion panels simulated for this project.
120 See LAWLESS, ROBBENNOLT & ULEN, supra note 85, at 248–54 (explaining the R
meaning of the chi-squared statistic).
121 The chi-squared test statistic is calculated by: .  In our
case, the observed values are the actual number of panels with 0, 1, 2, or 3
Republican appointees for each circuit, and the expected values for each circuit
are the simulated mean values.  For example, assume that a given circuit has 75
panels with 0 Republican appointees, 125 panels with 1 Republican appointee,
125 panels with 2 Republican appointees, and 75 panels with 3 Republican
appointees.  Assume further that our simulations found that the simulated mean
values were 100 panels with 0 Republican appointees, 100 panels with 1 Republi-
can appointee, 100 panels with 2 Republican appointees, and 100 panels with 3
Republican appointees.  The test statistic would then be calculated as:
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critical values of the c2 distribution with three degrees of free-
dom.122  In our case, we define circuits as displaying statisti-
cally significant evidence of nonrandomness when this test
produces a p-value lower than 0.1.123
Having discussed our reasons for doubting the random-
ness assumption, the specific hypothesis we set out to test, and
the data and methodology we used to test that hypothesis, we
now turn to our results.
III
TESTING THE ASSUMPTION OF RANDOM PANELS
In this Part, we present the results of using our simulation
method to test whether circuit court oral argument panels are
randomly created.  First, we present our primary analysis of
whether the ideological balance of panels is consistent with
random assignment.  This analysis reveals evidence of
nonrandom assignment within the circuit courts of appeals.
Second, we examine whether our findings are robust using an
alternative approach to define panels.  Specifically, to guard
against the possibility that our initial results are due to defini-
tional decisions, we adopt an alternative definition of panels
that considers sets of judges that hear cases together on multi-
ple days to be a single “panel.”  Although, as we explain below,
we believe that using the alternative approach to defining
panels is inappropriate because it actually masks over critical
sources of nonrandomness, there is still evidence of
.  This would produce a test statistic of 25.
This can then be compared to a chosen critical value of the c2(3) distribution (that
is, the chi-squared distribution with three degrees of freedom).  This would reveal
that a test statistic of 25 has a p-value of less than 0.001.
122 Although we are examining the number of panels with 0, 1, 2, or 3 Republi-
can appointees, there are three degrees of freedom—instead of four—because of
the constraint that the number of panels for the four combinations of panels must
sum to the total number of panels.  For example, if we know that there are 400
panels in a given circuit over a set time frame, and there are 75 panels with 0
Republican appointees, 125 panels with 1 Republican appointee, and 125 panels
with 2 Republican appointees, we would be able to know that the number of
panels with 3 Republican appointees is 75.
123 As an alternative approach to calculating statistical significance, for each
of our simulations for a given circuit we calculated the chi-squared test statistic.
That is, for each simulation i, we calculated the test statistic by using the number
of panels with 0, 1, 2, and 3 Republican appointees produced by simulation i as
the actual values and the overall simulated mean number as the expected values.
We then saved those test statistics for all 100,000 simulations for each circuit.
We then compared the test statistic produced by comparing the actual results to
the simulated means to the distribution of test statistics produced by our 100,000
simulations.  These values were nearly identical to the p-values produced by
comparing our overall test statistics to the c2(3) distribution.
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nonrandom assignment when using this approach.  Third, we
summarize our results and discuss some caveats that should
be kept in mind when evaluating our evidence of nonrandom-
ness, before turning to the implications of our findings.
A. Primary Results
Our primary results test whether the ideological balance of
actual oral argument panels was likely to have occurred if the
panels were strictly randomly formed.  To do so, we compared
the actual number of judges appointed by Republican presi-
dents on each panel to the expected number of judges ap-
pointed by Republican presidents based on the simulated
panels we created using the process outlined in subpart II.D.
The results of this analysis are presented graphically in
Figure 2.124  Each row in Figure 2 presents the results from a
different circuit.  For each circuit, the four graphs are density
plots of the number of times that each of the four outcomes
occurred in our 100,000 simulations.  While the density curves
are the simulated results, the vertical lines are the actual re-
sult.  When the actual ideological composition of panels differs
from the expected ideological composition of panels in a statis-
tically significant way, then the density curve for the circuit is
bold and solid.125  When the actual ideological composition of
panels does not differ from the expected ideological composi-
tion of panels, then the density curve for the circuit is dotted.
It is important to note that a statistically significant result
for a given circuit does not necessarily mean that there are
large differences between the actual ideological composition of
124 The results in Figure 2 are also presented in a table in Appendix A.  For a
discussion of the merits of using simulation techniques to present results graphi-
cally, see generally Gary King, Michael Tomz & Jason Wittenberg, Making the Most
of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 341 (2000); see also Jonathan P. Kastellec & Eduardo L. Leoni, Using Graphs
Instead of Tables in Political Science, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 755, 756 (2007) (“We show
that graphs [as opposed to tables] better communicate relevant information from
both data summaries and regression models, including comparing values across
variables or models and the sign and significance of predictors.”).  Although sta-
tistical results have been presented using graphs in the social sciences for over a
decade, in the last few years it has become increasingly common in the empirical
legal studies movement as well. See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton & Christopher A.
Whytock, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Comparative Institutional Competence,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 445–46, 450, 453–70 (2015); Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the
Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574, 597,
602–04, 610–11, 615–16, 621, 628–38 (2012); Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1124–25, 1131–35 (2011).
125 For a discussion of how we define statistical significance, see supra text
accompanying notes 121–23. R
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panels and the expected ideological composition of panels.  In-
stead, there can be a statistically significant difference even if
only a handful of panels are different between the actual and
expected results.
As Figure 2 shows, there is evidence that the panels are
nonrandom in four circuits: the D.C. Circuit, the Second Cir-
cuit, the Eighth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit.
FIGURE 2. SIMULATED DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGES
APPOINTED BY REPUBLICANS OVER A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD
(PART 1)
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FIGURE 2. SIMULATED DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGES
APPOINTED BY REPUBLICANS OVER A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD
(PART 2)
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For the D.C. Circuit, the Pearson’s chi-squared test statis-
tic is 6.42, which has a p-value of 0.09.  The size of this test
statistic is driven by two differences between the actual compo-
sition of panels and the expected composition of panels.  First,
there were more actual panels with 1 Republican appointee
(119) than the expected number produced by our simulations
(103).126  Second, there were fewer actual panels with 2 Repub-
lican appointees (240) than the expected number produced by
our simulations (261).127
For the Second Circuit, the Pearson’s chi-squared test sta-
tistic is 7.05, which has a p-value of 0.07.  The size of this test
126 See supra Figure 2, Part 1.
127 See supra Figure 2, Part 1.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 40  2-NOV-15 13:05
40 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1
statistic is also driven by two differences between the actual
composition of panels and the expected composition of panels.
First, there were fewer actual panels with 0 Republican appoin-
tees (191) than the expected number produced by our simula-
tions (213).128  Second, there were fewer actual panels with 3
Republican appointees (84) than the expected number pro-
duced by our simulations (103).129
For the Eighth Circuit, the Pearson’s chi-squared test sta-
tistic is 7.63, which has a p-value of 0.06.  The size of this test
statistic is also driven by two differences between the actual
composition of panels and the expected composition of panels.
First, there were fewer actual panels with 1 Republican ap-
pointee (40) than the number produced by our simulations
(56).130  Second, there were more actual panels with 2 Republi-
can appointees (379) than the number produced by our simu-
lations (350).131
For the Ninth Circuit, the Pearson’s chi-squared test statis-
tic is 21.84, which has a p-value of < 0.01.  The size of this test
statistic is due to across-the-board deviations between the ac-
tual composition of panels and the expected composition of
panels.  The two biggest deviations, however, are the number of
panels with 0 Republican appointees and the number of panels
with 1 Republican appointee.  There were more actual panels
with 0 Republican appointees (505) than the number produced
by our simulations (442).132  Additionally, there were fewer ac-
tual panels with 1 Republican appointee (900) than the num-
ber produced by our simulations (999).133
For the other eight circuits—the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh—we did not find any sta-
tistically significant evidence of nonrandomness.134  Of course,
it is important to note that the panel assignments in these
circuits may not be truly random.  It may be the case that the
panels were created in a nonrandom way, but happened to fall
within the band of what would be produced by a random pro-
cess.  Relatedly, it is worth noting that it may not be the case
that all of the circuits that we found statistically significant
128 See supra Figure 2, Part 1.
129 See supra Figure 2, Part 1.
130 See supra Figure 2, Part 2.
131 See supra Figure 2, Part 2.
132 See supra Figure 2, Part 2.
133 See supra Figure 2, Part 2.
134 It is worth noting that the results for the Fourth Circuit were close to
statistical significance. See supra Figure 2, Part 1.  For the Fourth Circuit, the
Pearson’s chi-squared test statistic is 5.77, which has a p-value of 0.11.
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results for used a nonrandom process.  It may instead be the
case that some (or all) of the evidence of nonrandomness was
simply due to chance—after all, results will be statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level just by chance 10% of the time.135  As
we discuss in subpart III.B., however, we are able to calculate
that the probability of all our results being due to chance is less
than 3%.
B. Robustness Checking
In addition to our primary results, we also evaluated
whether our analysis was robust to alternative ways of defining
panels.  As we discussed in subpart II.C, we believe that the
most supportable way to define panels is as three judges who
sit together for the same court session on the same day.  We
made the decision to define panels using that definition for two
reasons.  First, our qualitative research suggests that this defi-
nition of panels corresponds to how many of the circuits con-
ceive of panels.136  Second, this is also an objective definition of
panels that does not require making any arbitrary judgments
on where to draw lines.  This latter point both minimizes “re-
searcher degrees of freedom” (that is, the choices that we are
able to make that may influence statistical findings)137 and
makes it easier for other researchers to replicate our results.
That said, it is certainly the case that some circuits “draw”
panels and have the judges sit together on more than one day.
For example, a circuit may draw a panel of three judges and
have those judges sit together on three consecutive days, or
have the three judges sit together on Monday and then again
on Thursday.  It is not obvious, however, how to appropriately
account for the fact that some circuits may have judges sit
together on multiple days.
One reason that it is not clear how to appropriately ac-
count for the fact that some circuits elect to have judges sit
together on multiple days is that the decision to do so is itself a
potential source of nonrandomness.  If a circuit randomly
draws Judges A, B, and C to sit together and Judges X, Y, and
Z to sit together, but then has Judges A, B, and C sit together
for three days while Judges X, Y, and Z only sit together for one
135 For a longer discussion of this issue, see infra Subpart III.C.
136 See Levy, supra note 13. R
137 See, e.g., Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson & Uri Simonsohn, False-
Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows
Presenting Anything as Significant, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1359, 1360–62 (2011) (dis-
cussing and defining “researcher degrees of freedom”).
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day, this may be a way that nonrandomness is introduced into
the process.138  As a result, counting Judges A, B, and C as one
panel and also counting Judges X, Y, and Z as one panel would
have the effect of masking nonrandomness.
Ultimately, although we believe the way we defined panels
in our primary results is the most appropriate way to do so, we
also have experimented with trying to account for the fact that
when a circuit has three judges sit together on multiple days, it
may be a single “draw.”  To do so, we removed panels from our
data whenever the same three judges had sat together within
the proceeding seven days.  So if Judges A, B, and C sat to-
gether for court sessions on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday
of the same week, the second two days were removed from our
dataset.  Table 4 presents the number of panels for each circuit
using this alternative definition of panels.  This reduces the
number of panels in our sample from 10,364 to 6675 (leaving
roughly 64% of the original total).139
TABLE 4. PANELS BY TERM USING ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION
OF PANELS
  Term  
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
D.C. Circuit 90 84 89 91 86 440 
1st Circuit 63 56 56 53 59 287 
2nd Circuit 206 183 207 204 191 991 
3rd Circuit 61 69 57 63 49 299 
4th Circuit 113 110 104 132 134 593 
5th Circuit 59 52 49 48 51 259 
6th Circuit 157 142 143 164 146 752 
7th Circuit 137 121 123 114 110 605 
8th Circuit 69 82 72 73 67 363 
9th Circuit 248 288 288 242 265 1,331 
10th Circuit 101 88 82 79 74 424 
11th Circuit 55 60 65 71 80 331 
Total 1,359 1,335 1,335 1,334 1,312 6,675 
In addition to recalculating the number of panels in this
way, we also recalculated the percentage of panels that each
138 To be clear, the decision to have Judges A, B, and C sit together for three
days while Judges X, Y, and Z only sit together for one day may be completely
explainable by benign reasons.  For example, one of the judges—say Judge Z—
may have limited availability due to her senior status or a scheduling conflict.
139 Compare supra Table 1, with infra Table 4.
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judge sat on in every term using this new definition of panels.
Using this alternative definition of panels and the related new
data on judge availability, we resimulated our results using the
same process outlined in subpart II.D.  The results of this anal-
ysis are presented in Figure 3.140  As Figure 3 shows, there is
now evidence that the ideological balance of panels is non-
random in two circuits: the Second Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit.
FIGURE 3. SIMULATED DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGES APPOINTED BY
REPUBLICANS OVER A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD AFTER
REMOVING “DUPLICATE PANELS” (PART 1)
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140 The results in Figure 3 are also presented in a table in Appendix B.
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FIGURE 3. SIMULATED DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGES APPOINTED BY
REPUBLICANS OVER A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD AFTER
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For the Second Circuit, the Pearson’s chi-squared test sta-
tistic is 8.76, which has a p-value of 0.03.  The size of this test
statistic is primarily driven by three differences between the
actual composition of panels and the expected composition of
panels.  First, there were fewer actual panels with 0 Republican
appointees (127) than the expected number produced by our
simulations (150).141  Second, there were more actual panels
with 1 Republican appointee (450) than the expected number
produced by our simulations (418).142  Third, there were fewer
actual panels with 3 Republican appointees (67) than the ex-
pected number produced by our simulations (81).143
141 See supra Figure 3, Part 1.
142 See supra Figure 3, Part 1.
143 See supra Figure 3, Part 1.
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For the Ninth Circuit, the Pearson’s chi-squared test statis-
tic is 11.07, which has a p-value of 0.01.  The size of this test
statistic is driven by two differences between the actual compo-
sition of panels and the expected composition of panels.  First,
there were more actual panels with 0 Republican appointees
(267) than the number produced by our simulations (233).144
Second, there were fewer actual panels with 1 Republican ap-
pointee (509) than the number produced by our simulations
(563).145
For the other ten circuits, we did not find any statistically
significant evidence of nonrandomness when using this ap-
proach to define panels.146
C. Discussion
We believe that our findings have a number of implications
for both the judiciary and scholars.147  Before discussing the
implications of our primary findings, however, it is important to
acknowledge that no empirical study is without limitations,
and ours is no exception.  We believe that it is critical—and
consistent with best practices—to openly discuss the strengths
and weaknesses of any empirical research strategy.148
First, although we have worked with all twelve regional
circuit courts to assemble what we believe to be the most com-
prehensive dataset of panel assignments constructed to date,
that does not mean that our data does not have limitations.  As
we discussed in subpart II.C, our analysis is based on data of
oral argument panels, and the data is only on panels as they
actually sat and not on how they were initially formed.  Addi-
tionally, we define a draw of a panel as judges who sat together
on a particular day for a particular session, and in some cases
circuits drew panels for different periods.  Although we try to
account for these facts as best as possible—by, for example,
conducting the robustness check presented in subpart III.B—
these limitations have the potential to influence our findings.
144 See supra Figure 3, Part 2.
145 See supra Figure 3, Part 2.
146 See supra Figure 3.  Although it is worth noting that the results for the
Fourth Circuit were once again close to statistical significance: the Pearson’s chi-
squared test statistic is 5.64, which has a p-value of 0.12.
147 For more on the implications of our findings, see infra Part IV.
148 See Epstein & King, supra note 49, at 49–54.  As Epstein and King note, “a R
basic premise of all empirical research—and indeed of every serious theory of
inference—is that all conclusions are uncertain to a degree.” Id. at 50.  Given that
reality, as Epstein and King persuasively argue, it is perhaps especially important
that legal scholars conducting empirical research directly acknowledge assump-
tions and sources of uncertainty. Id.
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Second, our method cannot definitively identify whether
the courts used a strictly random process during this five-year
period; it instead can reveal only if the actual panels formed
were unlikely based on the distribution of results that a strictly
random process would have produced.  As we have noted, there
of course may be some instances where circuits used a non-
random process that our method does not identify, and other
instances where circuits used a random process that produced
unlikely distributions—after all, panels that are unlikely to
happen randomly should randomly happen sometimes.149  As
a result, even in circuit courts where the actual distribution of
judges appointed by a Republican president was near identical
to the distribution produced by our simulation, it still may be
the case that a nonrandom process was used.  Correspond-
ingly, even in circuits where we found evidence that a circuit’s
distribution of judges appointed by a Republican president was
an outlier, it may mean nothing.  What we can say is whether
the overall distributions—within circuits or across all the cir-
cuits—are unlikely to have happened randomly.  This is not a
defect of our research design but simply an inherent feature of
using observational data to test for randomness.150
All that said, it is possible to calculate the probability that
the evidence of nonrandomness that we found can be attrib-
uted to chance—and that probability is incredibly low.  We
have undertaken this test for our primary results reported in
subpart III.A in two ways.  First, we have calculated the
probability that we would have found 4 results that are statisti-
cally significant at the 0.1 level by chance in 12 opportunities
to do so.151  Since the outcome for each circuit is independent,
results that are statistically significant at the 0.1 level—which
is the standard we use—should occur by chance 10% of the
time.  By simulating 12 flips of a weighted coin—that is, one
149 See supra Subpart III.A.
150 The same principle has become a major talking point of the analytic sports
community, which has often driven home that evidence of outliers alone does not
“prove” anything. See, e,g., Aaron Schatz, Super Bowl XLIX’s Insane Penalty
Stats, FOOTBALL OUTSIDERS (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.footballoutsiders.com/
stat-analysis/2015/super-bowl-xlixs-insane-penalty-stats [http://perma.cc/
VM44-C8S8] (arguing that one year of unusual data regarding penalties called
against the Seattle Seahawks does not prove that officials are biased against that
team).  Instead, the existence of an outlier is merely evidence that should be
evaluated in context.  In our case, our quantitative evidence is supported by
qualitative evidence collected through extensive interviews and discussions with
judges and clerks. See generally Levy, supra note 13. R
151 That is, the chance of finding evidence of nonrandomness in four out of
twelve circuits.
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that produces a “1” 10% of the time and a “0” 90% of the time—
we can then determine the distribution of how many statisti-
cally significant results should have occurred by chance.152
Simulation suggests that 4 or more statistically significant re-
sults should occur by chance less than 3% of the time.  That is,
we can say with roughly 97% confidence that our results are
not attributable to chance alone.
Second, it is also possible to test the overall significance of
our primary results by taking the sum of the Pearson’s chi-
squared test statistics for all twelve circuits.  The sum of these
test statistics is 60.65.  The p-value of a test statistic of 60.65
with 36 degrees of freedom (3 degrees of freedom x 12 circuits =
36 total) is 0.006.  In other words, using this approach we can
say with roughly 99% confidence that the deviations from ran-
domness across twelve circuits would not have occurred by
chance.153
Of course, the alternative analysis reported in subpart III.B
only found statistically significant results for two circuits.  Just
as with our primary results, it is also possible to calculate the
probability that our results using this approach are attributa-
ble to chance.  First, using simulation to calculate the
probability of finding 2 or more statistically significant results
at the 0.1 level in 12 tries suggests that we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that our results are attributable to chance.
That is, 34% of simulations resulted in 2 or more statistically
significant results randomly occurring.  Second, the sum of the
Pearson’s chi-squared test statistics for all twelve circuits is
38.42.  The p-value of a test statistic of 38.42 with 36 degrees of
freedom is 0.36.  In other words, using this approach we can-
not say with confidence that our subpart III.B results are not
attributable to chance.
Although this may lead some readers to conclude that our
analysis has not produced convincing evidence of nonrandom
assignment in the circuit courts of appeals, we believe that
interpretation of our results would be a mistake for several
152 Just as with our primary analysis, we performed these simulations
100,000 times. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. R
153 The second approach to evaluating the probability of nonrandomness in
our overall results is likely preferable to the first approach because it accounts for
the degree of deviation from expected outcomes in every circuit instead of simply
treating nonrandomness as a binary outcome.  In other words, the first approach
treats the Fourth Circuit as “nonrandom” even though it has a p-value of 0.11 and
the D.C. Circuit as “random” because it has a p-value of 0.09.  The second ap-
proach, however, accounts for the degree of nonrandomness by taking the sum of
the test statistics.  We report the first approach primarily, however, to be con-
servative in our estimate.
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reasons.  First, we believe that removing panels of judges that
sat together multiple times in a set time period removes one
critical way that nonrandomness is introduced into the circuit
courts.154  Second, when using an alternative definition of de-
fining panels, we still found two circuits—the Second and the
Ninth—with a p-value of 0.03 or lower.  There is less than a 5%
probability of two results out of 12 with a p-value of 0.03 or
lower occurring randomly.  Finally, our qualitative research—
reported elsewhere155—found evidence that the circuit courts
use nonrandom processes that are consistent with our quanti-
tative findings reported in this paper.  In sum, we believe our
findings produce strong evidence that strictly random
processes are not always used to create oral argument panels
in the circuit courts of appeals.
IV
IMPLICATIONS
We believe that our results challenging the randomness of
panel assignment in the courts of appeals have several implica-
tions.  Fully appreciating their significance may ultimately re-
quire additional research and scrutiny of existing scholarship.
For now, however, we briefly consider the implications for the
three groupings identified at the outset of the Article: courts,
general court scholars, and empirical researchers.
A. Courts
First, our findings suggest that there is a much more
nuanced story about how the courts configure their panels
than that they rely on a random process.  As previously noted,
it may be that there are a host of considerations at work—from
the schedules of the judges, to recusals, to the return of cases
on remand.156  Accounting for these factors makes it impossi-
ble to achieve strict randomness, and scholars and practition-
ers should be aware of that fact.
Second, these findings could be relevant to the courts
themselves.  As previously stated, the qualitative evidence of
one of the coauthors strongly suggests that the causal mecha-
nism is an attempt to balance a series of otherwise arguably
benign factors.157  The cumulative effect, though, would be im-
154 For more on why we believe that our primary approach to defining panels is
more supportable, see supra Subpart III.B.
155 See Levy, supra note 13, at 20–30. R
156 See supra Subpart II.A.
157 See supra Subpart II.A.
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portant to know.  For example, as noted earlier, it could be that
a court with more panels of a particular ideological makeup
than would occur randomly relies on an ancillary circuit rule—
such as no panel may have more than one senior judge.  If that
circuit had quite a few senior judges who were Republican
appointees, say, then this rule would affect the ideological bal-
ance of panels.158  It is important to know the effect of such a
rule so that the court could then determine if it would be worth
continuing with such a practice.
Finally, the discussion of the potential reliance on these
other factors in constituting panels makes it all the more clear
that it is important to know how the circuits are, in fact, creat-
ing their argument panels.  Specifically, it would be useful to
better understand what factors the courts are taking into ac-
count and how those factors might differ from circuit to circuit.
Rather than focusing on whether panels are nonrandom, then,
future discussions would do well to focus on how and why they
are nonrandom.159
B. Court Scholars
Turning now to scholars who generally write on the federal
courts, the implications of our findings are fairly straightfor-
ward.  As a general matter, such scholars would do well to no
longer assume that all courts of appeals randomly create oral
argument panels.  For some scholarship—those articles that
simply mention random panels as a passing fact—this change
in assumption will likely not be significant.  For other kinds of
scholarship, however, the implications will be more
meaningful.
As noted in Part I,160 there is a fair amount of scholarship
that assumes panels are randomly configured and for which
the assumption is relevant.  Returning to a few earlier exam-
ples, one article made the argument that because oral argu-
ment panels are randomly drawn, the outcomes in agency
cases are akin to lottery results.161  Another article claimed
that random panels were important because they helped to
ensure that the courts of appeals did not fall prey to typical
group problems, such as polarization.162  Results suggesting
158 See McMillion, supra note 85, at 8 fig.3 (reporting that, as of March 7,
2014, 64% of all senior circuit judges were appointed by a Republican president).
159 See Levy, supra note 13, at 32–35. R
160 See supra Subpart I.B.
161 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. R
162 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. R
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that panels are not randomly configured, and moreover, that
the ideological balance of panels is affected in some circuits,
call these kinds of arguments into question.
Furthermore, Part I also notes several articles that assume
panels are randomly configured and then argue against that
assumed state of affairs.  One prominent example is the contri-
bution by Tiller and Cross, which calls for courts to create
panels with no more than two judges of either political party.163
Our findings show that in at least some of the circuits, there
are fewer panels with either all Democrat appointees or all
Republican appointees than would be expected.164  Thus, those
scholars who have taken the panels to be randomly configured
and then argued for a change to the status quo might now want
to question the premise and this, in turn, could lead to different
prescriptive conclusions.
C. Empirical Researchers
Finally, our results have important implications for re-
searchers that use empirical methods to study judicial behav-
ior.  As we discussed in Part I,165 random processes are
incredibly important for empirical research because they make
it possible to move beyond correlations and towards causation.
In part because of the importance of randomization to empiri-
cal research, researchers have relied heavily on the assumed
random assignment of judges to panels on the federal courts of
appeals to study judicial behavior.  Our results, however, pro-
vide evidence that the fundamental assumption that panel as-
signments are random may not be valid.
The main import of this finding is that empirical research-
ers should recognize and address the fact that panels may not
be fully random.  Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to
this problem.  As we previously discussed,166 in one article the
political scientist Matthew Hall excluded from his study cir-
cuits that he had reason to believe did not use random judicial
assignment.167  Although it may seem on first glance that the
easiest response to our findings would be to simply exclude
from future studies the four circuits that we identified as dis-
163 See Tiller & Cross, supra note 2, at 216–18, 232–34. R
164 The Second Circuit, for example, appears to have fewer panels with no
judges appointed by a Republican president and fewer panels with all three judges
appointed by a Republican president than expected by our model. See supra
Figure 2, Part 1.
165 See supra Subpart I.C.
166 See supra text accompanying notes 61–65. R
167 See Hall, supra note 4, at 580. R
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playing evidence of nonrandomness,168 we do not believe that
this fix would be sufficient for two reasons.  First, there is no
reason to believe that these results are static.  Instead, chief
judges change, Clerks’ Offices change personnel, and the
processes used by the circuits to create panels change over
time.169  As a result, simply excluding these circuits may not be
an adequate solution for scholars studying other time periods
than those in our study.  Second, several of the circuits we
identified as having nonrandom assignments—like the Second
Circuit and Ninth Circuit170—are among the largest and high-
est-profile circuits.  Simply excluding these circuits and others
from empirical research would likely be an unsatisfying re-
sponse to evidence of nonrandom panel assignment.
Ultimately, our findings could affect the findings of numer-
ous articles.  For some studies, our results may strengthen
their core findings; for other studies, our results may in some
ways weaken them.  Evaluating the full scope of the conse-
quences of nonrandomness will both require a case-by-case
evaluation of the research used in other studies, as well as
more research on the ways that circuit courts deviate from
random assignment.  But the primary takeaway is that re-
searchers should be cautious when making the fundamental
assumption that judges are randomly assigned to panels in the
federal courts of appeals.
CONCLUSION
How panels are formed in the federal appellate courts is an
important question.  To date, it has been assumed by many
scholars that the answer to this question is “randomly.”  Chal-
lenging that assumption has implications for our ability to
measure other key aspects of the courts, such as to what ex-
tent case outcomes are affected by the membership of the
panel.  It further shifts the way we study and understand the
processes of the courts more generally.
Ultimately, more work is needed to understand the true
assignment of judges to panels and its effects.  There is a need
for qualitative work to pinpoint how, precisely, panels are
formed.  There is also a need for future quantitative work to test
whether our results carry over to different time frames.  This
Article has provided a key step in better understanding the
168 Those circuits are the D.C. Circuit, Second Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and
Ninth Circuit. See supra Subpart III.A.
169 See Levy, supra note 13, at 20–30. R
170 See supra Part III.
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practices of the federal judiciary; we look forward to the gains
to come.
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APPENDIX A.
SIMULATED DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGES APPOINTED BY REPUBLICANS
PANELS DEFINED BY JUDGES SITTING TOGETHER FOR A COURT











D.C. Circuit 6.42 0.09 
0 Republicans 4 8 3 12  
1 Republican 119 103 88 118  
2 Republicans 240 261 242 279  
3 Republicans 147 139 122 155  
1st Circuit 0.76 0.86 
0 Republicans 7 8 4 13  
1 Republican 82 81 69 94  
2 Republicans 157 152 138 166  
3 Republicans 52 57 46 68  
2nd Circuit 7.05 0.07 
0 Republicans 191 213 191 235  
1 Republican 595 571 542 601  
2 Republicans 462 448 420 477  
3 Republicans 84 103 87 119  
3rd Circuit 2.93 0.39 
0 Republicans 30 36 27 46  
1 Republican 217 200 181 220  
2 Republicans 292 304 283 326  
3 Republicans 130 128 112 145  
4th Circuit 5.77 0.11 
0 Republicans 55 46 36 57  
1 Republican 203 204 185 223  
2 Republicans 232 254 234 274  
3 Republicans 107 92 79 107  
5th Circuit 1.68 0.64 
0 Republicans 11 11 6 17  
1 Republican 142 133 116 150  
2 Republicans 387 405 381 429  
3 Republicans 337 328 305 352  
6th Circuit 4.04 0.25 
0 Republicans 48 54 42 66  
1 Republican 346 323 298 348  
2 Republicans 528 556 527 584  
3 Republicans 284 273 250 297  
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7th Circuit 0.88 0.83 
0 Republicans 2 4 1 7  
1 Republican 63 65 52 77  
2 Republicans 277 273 253 293  
3 Republicans 267 268 248 288  
8th Circuit 7.63 0.06 
0 Republicans 2 2 0 4  
1 Republican 40 56 45 69  
2 Republicans 379 350 327 374  
3 Republicans 420 433 409 457  
9th Circuit 21.84 <0.01 
0 Republicans 505 442 411 473  
1 Republican 900 999 960 1038  
2 Republicans 720 705 669 742  
3 Republicans 176 155 136 175  
10th Circuit 0.52 0.91 
0 Republicans 20 18 11 25  
1 Republican 116 120 104 135  
2 Republicans 202 203 186 220  
3 Republicans 91 88 75 102  
11th Circuit 1.14 0.77 
0 Republicans 34 38 29 48  
1 Republican 215 205 185 225  
2 Republicans 307 314 293 336  
3 Republicans 139 138 121 155  
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APPENDIX B.
SIMULATED DISTRIBUTION OF JUDGES APPOINTED BY REPUBLICANS
PANELS DEFINED BY JUDGES SITTING TOGETHER WITHIN 7-DAY











D.C. Circuit     3.48 0.32 
0 Republicans 4 6 3 11  
1 Republican 98 87 74 101  
2 Republicans 210 225 207 242  
3 Republicans 128 122 107 138  
1st Circuit 1.07 0.78 
0 Republicans 7 8 4 13  
1 Republican 81 81 68 93  
2 Republicans 152 146 132 159  
3 Republicans 47 52 42 63  
2nd Circuit 8.76 0.03 
0 Republicans 127 150 132 169  
1 Republican 450 418 393 444  
2 Republicans 347 341 317 365  
3 Republicans 67 81 68 96  
3rd Circuit 0.75 0.86 
0 Republicans 15 17 11 24  
1 Republican 97 91 78 104  
2 Republicans 132 134 120 149  
3 Republicans 55 56 45 67  
4th Circuit 5.64 0.12 
0 Republicans 55 46 36 57  
1 Republican 201 203 184 221  
2 Republicans 231 252 233 272  
3 Republicans 106 92 78 106  
5th Circuit 0.41 0.94 
0 Republicans 4 4 1 7  
1 Republican 43 41 31 51  
2 Republicans 114 119 106 132  
3 Republicans 98 95 83 108  
6th Circuit 3.53 0.32 
0 Republicans 32 34 25 44  
1 Republican 219 204 184 224  
2 Republicans 323 347 324 369  
3 Republicans 178 168 149 186  
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7th Circuit 0.86 0.84 
0 Republicans 2 4 1 7  
1 Republican 63 64 52 77  
2 Republicans 275 271 251 291  
3 Republicans 265 266 246 286  
8th Circuit 2.17 0.51 
0 Republicans 1 1 0 3  
1 Republican 21 27 19 35  
2 Republicans 165 154 139 170  
3 Republicans 176 181 165 197  
9th Circuit 11.07 0.01 
0 Republicans 267 233 211 256  
1 Republican 509 563 533 592  
2 Republicans 442 430 402 459  
3 Republicans 113 104 88 121  
10th Circuit 0.37 0.95 
0 Republicans 19 17 11 24  
1 Republican 116 118 103 133  
2 Republicans 198 201 184 218  
3 Republicans 91 88 74 102  
11th Circuit 0.30 0.96 
0 Republicans 18 19 12 26  
1 Republican 103 99 86 113  
2 Republicans 145 148 134 163  
3 Republicans 65 64 52 76  
